When Syria was in Egypt’s land: Egyptians cooperate with Syrians,but less with each other

Public Choice - With the number of people fleeing Syria since 2011 exceeding 5 million, and unclear prospects regarding the country’s future, Syrians currently residing outside their homeland...     

The Effects of Competition Policy on Development – Cross-Country Evidence Using Four New Indicators

Over the last two decades, many developing countries have introduced competition policies. This paper introduces four new indicators on various aspects of competition laws and competition agencies to make competition policies comparable. These indicators are used to estimate the effects of competition policies and all four contribute at least marginally to explaining differences in total factor productivity. This is also true if developing countries are analysed separately. In addition to the direct effects of competition policy on total factor productivity, an indirect effect is identified: countries scoring high with regard to competition policy suffer less from corruption.     

Explaining constitutional garrulity

Constitutions differ dramatically in length although they serve very similar functions everywhere. This paper tries to identify some determinants of constitutional length. It contains a new dataset spelling out the length of 135 constitutions in words. It turns out that a common law legal origin significantly increases the length of the constitution, whereas countries in the Middle East and North Africa have significantly shorter constitutions. Further, having been a British or Spanish colony is correlated with longer constitutions, a higher share of Protestants with shorter constitutions.     

Clinical forensic examination findings and legal outcome in cases of suspected sexual child abuse

The clinical forensic examinations conducted at the Institute of Legal Medicine of the Hanover Medical School between 1999 and 2008 in cases of suspected sexual abuse of children were evaluated retrospectively and analysed with regard to their legal outcome. In total, the study included 223 children (172 girls, 51 boys) with a median age of 8.6 years. In 34 children (15.2%), forensically relevant diagnostic findings due to anogenital injury and/or detection of semen were recorded. Perpetrators were convicted more often when they were not a member of the victim's family. In cases with victims aged seven years or older, conviction was more common. The study shows that medical findings can best be preserved by an immediate clinical forensic examination. Suspected sexual child abuse can often not be proved by medical examination results, but in some cases diagnostic findings are not mandatory for conviction.     

Positive constitutional economics II��a survey of recent developments

Analysis of the economic effects of constitutional rules has made substantial progress over the last decade. This survey provides an overview of this rapidly growing research area and also discusses a number of methodological issues and identifies underresearched areas. It argues that the next logical step of positive constitutional economics is to endogenize constitutional rules.     

The economic effects of federalism and?decentralization—a cross-country assessment

This paper explores the idea that institutional details matter and that attempts to estimate the economic effects of federalism by employing a simple dummy variable neglect potentially important institutional details. Based on a principal component analysis, seven aspects of both federalism and decentralization are used as variables for explaining differences in (1) fiscal policy, (2) government effectiveness, (3) economic productivity, and (4) happiness. The results show that institutional details do, indeed, matter. Different aspects of federalism impact on the outcome variables to different degrees. This study adds to our knowledge on the transmission mechanisms of federalism and decentralization.     

The economic effects of direct democracy—a first global assessment

This is the first study that assesses the economic effects of direct democratic institutions on a cross-country basis. We find that total spending as well as spending on welfare is lower in countries with mandatory referendums, consistent with the previous literature. But we also find that countries with national initiatives appear to spend more and be more corrupt. Finally, budget deficits, government effectiveness, productivity and “happiness” appear unrelated to direct democracy. Institutional detail thus matters a great deal. In general, the effects of direct-democratic institutions become stronger if the frequency of their actual use is taken into account. Effects are usually stronger in countries with weak democracies.