Recent developments in cornea transplantation (1997-1999)

Between 1997 and 1999 a steady increase in cornea donations was achieved, but the number of transplantations remained stable because many grafts did not pass quality control. Intermediate organ culture of entire bulbi was examined as a possible solution to reduce post-mortem times and increase suitability for transplantation.     

Clinical and forensic examinations of glycemic marker 1,5-anhydroglucitol by means of high performance liquid chromatography tandem mass spectrometry

Postmortem diagnosis of diabetes and a diabetic coma can be difficult because of the lack of characteristic morphological findings. 1,5-Anhydroglucitol (1,5-AG), the 1-deoxy form of glucose, competes with glucose for reabsorption in the kidneys. Therefore, diabetics with a permanent hyperglycemia show significantly lower serum concentrations of 1,5-AG than non-diabetics. A liquid chromatography-mass spectrometric method for the determination of 1,5-AG in serum and postmortem blood was developed and validated according to international guidelines. Linearity was given between 1μg/ml and 50μg/ml. Recovery rates ranged between 70.8% and 89.8%, the limit of quantification of the procedure was 0.20μg/ml, limit of quantification was 0.55μg/ml. Serum of 199 diabetics and 116 non-diabetics and femoral blood of 31 diabetic and 27 non-diabetic deceased was measured. Average concentrations were significantly (p<0.001) higher in non-diabetics compared to diabetics ante and postmortem. Seven of the diabetics may have died because of a hyperglycemic coma indicated by a sum formula of Traub>450mg/dl. 1,5-AG average concentrations in these deceased were not significantly different to diabetics which did not die because of a diabetic coma. Concentrations of 1,5-AG give a hint for not well controlled diabetes antemortem and postmortem and can be assumed as an additional and alternative information postmortem to the measurement of HbA1c or fructosamine.     

Premature repayment of fixed interest mortgage loans without compensation,a case of misguided consumer protection in the EU

European Journal of Law and Economics - Consumer protection shifts risks from consumers to businesses. This raises marginal costs and equilibrium prices. It is justified when markets are not strong...     

Decriminalizing the issuance of bad checks in Turkey: an analysis of the effects of changes in penalties

The aim of this study is to carry out an economic analysis of the consequences that arose following the decriminalization of the issuance of bad checks in Turkey. In our statistical analysis we examined the legal situation of bouncing checks in three periods: before 2009 when the issuance of bad checks was subject to imprisonment, between 2009 and 2012 when a partial decriminalization took place and between 2012 and 2014 when the issuance of bouncing checks was fully decriminalized and penalties were reduced to only administrative fines. We test the hypotheses that partial or full decriminalization led to a rise in the number of bad checks in Turkey. We find that there is no statistical evidence for an association between the first, modest step of the decriminalization process (Law No. 5941) and the frequency with which checks bounced in Turkey. However, full decriminalization of bouncing checks (Law No. 6273) led to an increase in the frequency of bad checks. We also find that the establishment of a Risk Center by the Bank Association of Turkey helped to identify customers not worthy of credit and was successful in decreasing the frequency of bad checks. We conclude that in the case of Turkish check law imprisonment was more effective in deterring writers of bad checks than the administrative and civil sanctions that are now in place. Nonetheless, private credit screening efforts also promoted the targeted policy goal of limiting the number of bad checks in Turkey.     

Institutional competition of optional codes in European contract law

The Common European Sales Law (CESL) is the European Commission’s most recent policy initiative for European contract law. It aims to address the problem that differences between the national contract laws of the Member States may constitute an obstacle for the European Internal Market. This paper develops a model of the institutional competition in European contract law and uses it to addresses the question as to whether an optional European contract code and the CESL are economically desirable for European contract law. To do so I examine the transaction costs involved in the process of choosing an applicable law that European businesses face when they conduct cross-border transactions in the European Internal Market. I then describe how these transaction costs shape the competitive environment, i.e. what I refer to as the “European market for contract laws” in which the contracting parties choose a law to govern their cross-border contracts. Having identified this environment and the competitive forces operating within it, I propose a model, the “Cycle of European Contract Law”. I use this model to analyze the competitive processes that take place in the European market for contract laws. Based on my results I make recommendations for the optimal implementation of an optional European contract code and the CESL in European contract law.