Revisiting the “But Everybody Does That!” Defense

Law and Philosophy - It’s not uncommon for people to try to shield themselves from blame or punishment by saying, “But everybody does that!”. This BEDT defense seems more...     

The Marxian theory of crisis,capital and the state ∗

An interpretation of the Marxian theory of crisis that rejects the ‘Keynesianism’ of most post-war contributions on the topic. Various criticisms of Marx's position are examined and two popular but incorrect versions of the theory are discussed; the underconsumptionist and disproportionality theory of crisis. An attempt is made to begin an analysis of the role of state intervention in the economy and indicate the limitations of intervention by the capitalist state implied by Marx's theory of crisis.     

In Defense of Criminal Possession

Criminal law casebooks and treatises frequently mention the possibility that criminal liability for possession is inconsistent with the Voluntary Act Requirement, which limits criminal liability to that which includes an act or an omission. This paper explains why criminal liability for possession is compatible with the Voluntary Act Requirement despite the fact that possession is a status. To make good on this claim, the paper (1) defends the Voluntary Act Requirement, (2) offers an account of the nature of omissions of the kind that need be included in that for which criminal liability is imposed in the absence of a voluntary act, and (3) argues that possession is a status that is constituted in part by an omission of this sort. The result is that to hold people criminally liable for possession is to hold them criminally liable both for a status and for an omission, an omission that is part of what it is to have that status. The paper also distinguishes possession from vagrancy, which is not a proper object of criminal liability, precisely because of constraints placed by the Voluntary Act Requirement. And the paper argues that possession incident to dispossession is not a proper object of criminal liability because it does not involve an omission of the kind that other forms of possession involve.     

More Attempts: A Reply to Duff, Husak, Mele and Walen

In this paper, I reply to the very thoughtful comments on my book by Antony Duff, Doug Husak, Al Mele and Alec Walen.     

Mens Rea by the Numbers

Before the recent presidential election, a bipartisan congressional effort was made to pass a criminal justice reform bill. The bill faltered in part because of a proposed default mens rea provision: statutes silent on mens rea, that were not explicitly identified as strict liability by the legislature, would be taken to require for guilt proof of knowledge with respect to each material element. This paper focusses on a prominent line of disagreement about the default mens rea provision. Proponents argued that it would reduce the number of unjust verdicts in corporate cases. They noted that there have been convictions of corporations and corporate officers for public welfare offenses in instances in which there was good reason to believe that the defendants lacked mens rea. They touted the legislation, then, as a way of reducing the false positive rate. Opponents noted that the provision would also reduce the rate of true positives in corporate prosecutions—convictions of those possessing mens rea who could not be proven to—and opposed the legislation on those grounds. Both sides, then, accepted that the relevant question was, in part, numerical: under the provision, would the reductions in guilty verdicts of those lacking mens rea outnumber and outweigh the increases in acquittals of those possessing it? This paper critically examines this numerical approach for assessing and justifying the default mens rea provision. The paper argues that there is a small domain under which it is appropriate to reason in such numerical terms about a default mens rea provision, but that that domain is so small as to make such arguments inappropriate when it comes to sweeping legislation, such as that proposed. The paper further argues that in light of this conclusion the default mens rea provision must be examined non-numerically, through appeal to principled considerations about the necessary conditions for morally justified infliction of punishment. When such arguments are freed from numerical considerations of the kind that dominated the public discussion of the legislation, they decide the matter: the default mens rea provision deserves bipartisan support.     

Intending to Aid

Courts and commentators are notoriously puzzled about the mens rea standards for complicity. Accomplices intend to aid, but what attitude need they have towards the crimes that they aid? This paper both criticizes extant accounts of the mens rea of complicity and offers a new account. The paper argues that an intention can commit one to an event’s occurrence without committing one to promoting the event, or making it more likely to take place. Under the proposed account of the mens rea of complicity, an accomplice must have an intention that commits him to the crime’s occurrence, but need not commit him to making it more likely that the crime occurs. The paper traces the implications of this view both for several difficult complicity cases, and for ongoing debates among philosophers of action about the necessary and sufficient conditions of joint agency.