Oxytocin and the Biological Basis for Interpersonal and Political Trust

Political scientists have documented the many ways in which trust influences attitudes and behaviors that are important for the legitimacy and stability of democratic political systems. They have also explored the social, economic, and political factors that tend to increase levels of trust in others, in political figures, and in government. Neuroeconomic studies have shown that the neuroactive hormone oxytocin, a peptide that plays a key role in social attachment and affiliation in non-human mammals, is associated with trust and reciprocity in humans (e.g., Kosfeld et al., Nature 435:673–676, 2005; Zak et al., Horm Beh 48:522–527, 2005). While oxytocin has been linked to indicators of interpersonal trust, we do not know if it extends to trust in government actors and institutions. In order to explore these relationships, we conducted an experiment in which subjects were randomly assigned to receive a placebo or 40 IU of oxytocin administered intranasally. We show that manipulating oxytocin increases individuals’ interpersonal trust. It also has effects on trust in political figures and in government, though only for certain partisan groups and for those low in levels of interpersonal trust.     

Don’t stop believing: the relative impact of internal alibi details on judgments of veracity

The relative impact of five alibi components on the assessment of alibi veracity was investigated using a policy-capturing methodology. Participants (N?=?115) were instructed to assume the role of a homicide investigator and evaluate 32 alibis that varied on five dichotomous variables: Salaciousness; Legality; Change in Details; Superfluous Details; and Specific Details. Participants evaluated the believability of each alibi, and the likelihood of the alibi provider’s guilt. Results indicated that participants tended to disbelieve suspects when illegal or salacious behaviours were mentioned within the alibi. Few decision policies contained Change in Details, Superfluous Details, or Specific Details. The potential implications for alibi assessments during police investigations are discussed.     

Preliminary evidence on the determinants of Federal Reserve open market operations

We are grateful to Marcelle Chauvet, Marvin Goodfriend, Stefano Manzocchi, Jiannis Venieris and an anonymous referee for comments. The usual caveat about errors applies.     

Persuasive Narratives and Costly Actions

Persuasive narratives can induce some individuals to engage in costly actions. Entrepreneurs of suicide missions frame the necessity of violent behavior within the context of persuasive narratives to attract potential recruits. Herein we report results from an experiment to test factors involved with costly action linked to a persuasive narrative. We recruited 164 participants (M = 21, SD = 5.20) and measured hormones, electrodermal activity, and personality to predict who would be influenced by the narrative's message. We found that the persuasive narrative we tested resulted in costly action by those who are high-perspective takers and are more physiologically aroused by the narrative. The findings fill lacunae in the literature, providing a novel approach to examine costly behavior (like martyrdom missions) in the laboratory.     

The Politics of Fertility and Economic Development

This paper presents a formal model that characterizes the two faces of development—persistent poverty, and industrialization and rising incomes—and establishes that the interaction between politics and economics determines which path a nation travels. We demonstrate that political factors affect fertility decisions so that a one-time disturbance compounds across generations, impacting a country's entire development trajectory. Modeling strategic multiobjective policy-setting by the government, we derive a new concept of political capacity and prove that a sufficient amount of political capacity is necessary to escape a poverty trap and develop the economy. Empirical tests for a sample of 100 countries from 1960 to 1990 provide strong support for the predictions of the formal model. In particular, we show that both political stability and political capacity significantly influence birth rates. We conclude that politics can be either a stimulant or a barrier to economic development.