Without Negative Origins and Absolute Ends: A Jurisprudence of the Singular

This paper is a preparatory analysis for a jurisprudence of the singular. Through a critical analysis of the negativity and the absolving character of the transcendental metaphysics of law and justice it reads mainly through M. Heidegger, Heraclitus, G. Agamben and J-L. Nancy a realignment of the questioning of justice that takes its provisional name in ‘dike’, at thepoint where the routes of ontology, the juridical and the political intersect and reveal the pseudo-propriety of their presuppositions. Without the transcendental dialectical discourse of the origin and its absolving-absolute ‘ends’, this paper re-poses the urgency of thinking the singular-multiple ‘right’ otherwise. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.