Securing Liberty in the Face of Terror: Reflections from Criminal Justice

Post-9/11 the equilibrium between security and liberty has been subject to intense political and philosophical interrogation. The metaphor of balance, although perilous, is so pervasive as to demand scrutiny of what lies in the scales, what tips them, and in whose interest. Though international and constitutional lawyers have dominated the debate about balance, the experience of criminal justice suggests that articulating a principled approach provides greater prospects of protecting rights against unwarranted erosion. This more modest approach imposes structural and procedural safeguards through the twin engines of judicial oversight and unremitting defence of due process. In this way it may be possible to enhance collective security against terrorism without diminishing individual security against the state.     

Terrorizing Criminal Law

The essays in Waldron’s Torture, Terror, and Trade-Offs have important implications for debates about the criminalization of terrorism and terrorism-related offences and its consequences for criminal law and criminal justice. His reflections on security speak directly to contemporary debates about the preventive role of the criminal law. And his analysis of inter-personal security trade-offs invites much closer attention to the costs of counter-terrorism policies, particularly those pursued outside the criminal process. But is Waldron right to speak of a ‘welcome the return to the criminal justice model’? This article considers the arguments in favour of prioritizing the prosecution of terrorist suspects and asks if their prosecution can safely proceed without undue hazard to the criminal law and criminal process.     

Defending the Criminal Law: Reflections on the Changing Character of Crime, Procedure, and Sanctions

Recent years have seen mounting challenge to the model of the criminal trial on the grounds it is not cost-effective, not preventive, not necessary, not appropriate, or not effective. These challenges have led to changes in the scope of the criminal law, in criminal procedure, and in the nature and use of criminal trials. These changes include greater use of diversion, of fixed penalties, of summary trials, of hybrid civil–criminal processes, of strict liability, of incentives to plead guilty, and of preventive orders. The paper will assess the implications of these changes for the function of the criminal law, assessing the reasons behind them, and examining whether or not they are to be welcomed. Identifying the larger import of these changes draws attention to the changing relationship between state and citizen as well as changes in the nature of the state itself. These can in turn be attributed to a jostling among the different manifestations of the authoritarian state, the preventive state, and the regulatory state. These changes have profound normative implications for a liberal theory of the criminal law that require its re-articulation and its defence. A modest start may be to insist that where the conduct is criminal and the consequences are punitive the protections of criminal procedure and trial must be upheld.