Representational Altruism: The Wary Cooperator as Authoritative Decision Maker

What drives policymakers to put the interests of others above their own? If human nature is inherently selfish, it makes sense to institutionalize incentives that counter decision makers' temptations to use their positions to benefit themselves over others. A growing literature rooted in evolutionary theories of human behavior, however, suggests that humans, under certain circumstances, have inherent predispositions towards “representational altruism,” i.e., to make an authoritative decision to benefit another at one's own expense. Drawing on Hibbing and Alford's conception of the wary cooperator, a theoretical case is made for such behavioral expectations, which are confirmed in a series of original laboratory experiments.     

Managing commercial risks in open source software licensing

Legal context: The article reviews the commercial risk allocation clauses intypical open source licence terms and discusses their enforceabilityand implications. Key points: The enforceability of warranty disclaimers and limitation ofliability clauses in common open source licence terms is questionable,particularly in a cross-border context, and commercial licensorsshould take additional steps to protect themselves from down-streamrisks. Practical significance: Open source software presents a number of unusual commercialissues, because it is available free of charge and the providerstry to disclaim warranties and liabilities. End users and resellershave to adjust their own in- and out-licensing models to accommodatethis situation.     

Preparing to Be Colonized: Land Tenure and Legal Strategy in Nineteenth-Century Hawaii

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, throughout the Pacific Rim, European and American colonizers reorganized indigenous systems of property rights in land to make them look more like European property systems, with disastrous effects for the indigenous people involved. The very first of these schemes, however, was the Māhele of 1845–1855, which took place not in a colony but in the independent Kingdom of Hawaii. Why did the Hawaiians do this to themselves? I argue that the Māhele was a sophisticated and partially successful response to the prospect that Hawaii would soon be colonized. The object of the Māhele was to ensure that in the event of annexation, Kamehameha III and other elite Hawaiians would not be dispossessed of their landholdings. The strategy was to convert those landholdings into a legal form that would be recognized by an incoming colonial government—whether American, British, or French—as private property.     

Liberal Equality, Exploitation, and the Case for an Unconditional Basic Income

This paper considers whether arguments presented in Philippe Van Parijs' Real Freedom for All: What (if Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? succeed in rebutting the objection that the introduction of a substantial unconditional basic income (UBI) would allow non-working citizens to free-ride on the efforts of, and so exploit, working citizens. It considers Van Parjis' 'external assets argument' for UBI, and finds that this argument does not succeed in reconciling payment of a substantial UBI with the reciprocity principle which underpins this 'exploitation objection'. It considers and rejects Van Parijs' implicit claim that the exploitation objection must be grounded in a distributive principle which contradicts the egalitarian commitment to prevent brute luck inequality. It concludes that Van Parjis has failed, thus far, to articulate a convincing response to the exploitation objection.     

Does Federalism Weaken Democratic Representation in the United States?

The framers of the U.S. Constitution explicitly designed federalismto enhance representation. Because powers are divided amongmultiple governments, citizens are able to exert pressure onthe elected officials of various governments in an effort toachieve desired outcomes. If one government is not doing whatcitizens prefer, they can seek it from a different government.This assumes that individuals form opinions about the functionsperformed by different governments. Given the complexity offederalism, this may be an unrealistic assumption for many citizens.Original survey data uniquely suited to explore this questionsuggest that citizens do behave in a fashion consistent withthe federalist framework. Moreover, the actual change in theassignment of functional responsibilities across governmentsbehaves as if it responds to public opinion.