Negotiation democracy versus consensus democracy: Parallel conclusions and recommendations

Abstract. In spite of a large number of disagreements concerning methodological and classificatory questions between Klaus Armingeon and myself, our substantive conclusions are very similar. Armingeon concludes that all three aspects of his negotiation democracy (consociationalism, corporatism, and counter-majoritarian institutions) result in superior government performance in selected areas – a finding that I interpret as supportive of my similar claims for the executives-parties dimension of consensus democracy (which consists of consociationalism plus corporatism) as well as for the federal-unitary dimension (which is the same as Armingeon's counter-majoritarian institutions). We are therefore also in broad agreement on the advice we can give to democratic constitutional engineers.     

Non-Majoritarian Democracy: A Comparison of Federal and Consociational Theories

In an earlier attempt to compare federalism and consociationalism,I found that, both conceptually and empirically, they do notcoincide but that they do overlap to a significant extent. Inthis second comparison, my point of departure is that both conceptsentail a rejection of majoritarian democracy. Eight characteristicsof non-majoritarian democracy—or consensus democracy—canbe identified: (1) executive power sharing, (2) balanced executive-legislativerelations, (3) strong bicameralism, (4) multiparty system, (5)multi-dimensional party system, (6) proportional representation,(7) federalism and decentralization, and (8) a written constitutionand minority veto. Consociational theorists tend to emphasizethe non-majoritarian attributes of power sharing, proportionalrepresentation, and multi-partyism, whereas federal theoristsstress the non-majoritarian characteristics of strong bicameralismand rigid constitutions, in addition to federalism itself. Asimilar pattern is revealed by a factor analysis of these variablesin twenty-two democratic regimes. Although consociationalismand federalism are non-majoritarian in nature, they representclearly different dimensions of non-majoritarianism.     

A new political system

Nomination: Trichotomy or dichotomy? by Arend Lijphart, p.125
Nomination: Semi–presidentialism: A political model at work by Gianfranco Pasquino, p.128
Reflections: The political system of the European Unionby Maurice Duverger, p.137     

Dimensions of democracies

Nomination: Arguments in favour of 'Democracies_—' by Manfred G. Schmidt, p.193
Reflections: Dimensions of democracy by Arend Lijphart, p.195     

The field of electoral systems research: A critical survey

The purpose of this article is to survey and evaluate the development and the current state of the field of electoral systems research. It will treat both the field's strengths and its weaknesses, but my main emphasis will be on the weaknesses and, on the whole, I shall be quite critical. My critique will move from the general to the specific: I shall begin with some very general observations concerning the state of the field, and end with a discussion of one specific, but by no means minor, problem: the crucial question of how we should measure the degree of proportionality or disproportionality of different electoral systems.     

Dimensions of democracies

Abstract The conventional wisdom concerning the choice between majoritarian electoral systems and proportional representation (PR) - and, more broadly, between majoritarian and consensus forms of democracy - is that there is a trade-off: PR and consensus democracy provide more accurate representation and better minority representation, but majoritarianism provides more effective government. A comparative analysis of 18 older and well-established democracies, most of which are European democracies, shows that PR and consensus democracy indeed give superior political representation, but that majoritarian systems do not perform better in maintaining public order and managing the economy, and hence that the over-all performance of consensus democracy is superior. This conclusion should also be tested among the growing number of slightly newer non-European democracies, which are already old enough to have proved their viability and can be studied over an extended period of time. If its validity is confirmed - and the evidence so far is very promising -it can have great practical significance for the future of democracy in the world.