Reversal of fortune: the politics and economics of the superconducting supercollider

Congress approved the superconducting supercollider (SSC), but later cut all funding after construction for the project had begun. We claim that this reversal was due, in part, to a problem of time inconsistency. Representatives from states in contention to receive the project had an incentive to support it early in the process. Once Texas was chosen as the SSC site, the other contender states had a greatly diminished incentive to continue to support it. Our empirical results show that the probability of switching from ‘for’ to ‘against’ the project is significantly higher for representatives from the former contender states.     

Hiding in plain sight – using signals to detect terrorists

This paper studies the interaction between a governmental security agency, as the Transportation Security Agency, or the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and a terrorist organization, like Al Qaeda. The governmental agency wants to stop the terrorists, but first must infer whether a visa applicant or an airline passenger is a terrorist on the basis of some observable signal. The terrorist organization's objective is to get past security to commit murder and mayhem. We derive the equilibrium strategy for this signaling model, and evaluate specific anti-terrorist policies, as the creation of the new Homeland Security Agency and increased airport security screening.