ELECTRICITY PLANNING IN TASMANIA AND NEW ZEALAND: POLITICAL PROCESSES AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL IMPERATIVE

Abstract: This paper considers but rejects a thesis that there is some sort of 'technological imperative' in operation in the process of electricity planning which requires the integration of electricity generating systems with large industrial consumers. It is argued that there is nothing about the technical features of electricity generation and supply that does not translate into costs and benefits (which can be subsequently paid, enjoyed or ignored by decision-makers). Instead a Galbraithian thesis of technocracy is examined, but this is found to be insufficient to explain fully the electricity planning process in Australia and New Zealand and the relationship of that process to electricity-intensive industry. After examining cases of forecasting and planning in New Zealand and Tasmania (both predominantly reliant on intensive hydro-electric systems), it is concluded that a full appreciation requires an understanding of the relationship between government and business, a relationship which is rooted long ago in the colonial origins of both countries.     

Policy Change and Industry Associability: The Australian Mining Sector

In this paper we use evidence from the recent trajectories of mining industry associations in the Australian federation to argue for the significance of institutional explanations for the formation and maintenance of interest groups. We argue that the recent lack of consultation by the Commonwealth government with the Minerals Council of Australia over resources rent taxation proposals reflected a weakness that resulted from the shifting basis of associability stemming from institutional changes.     

Steering through Complexity: EU Environmental Regulation in the International Context

The nature of governance in the European Union (EU) and its member states is continuing to evolve as the EU develops. This paper focuses on the challenges to this governance process in the sector of environmental policy, and particularly the role of external organizations and states in providing alternate policy fora. The policy impact of these institutions and organizations leads to more actor participation in a way that EU players may not be able to anticipate or control since the EU is only one of several arenas involved. Both states and non-governmental actors actively seek to shift issues to arenas that provide them advantages. Consequently, developments in other arenas shape and are shaped by EU issues as actors pursue forum shopping. The paper presents two cases, the amendment of the Basel Convention to ban hazardous wastes export and the EU regulation of chemical risk, which demonstrate how external players can shape EU regulation.     

Fifty Years of the OECD and Forty Years of Australian Membership

The Country Party leader Jack McEwen said that Australia would join the OECD “over my dead body” and it did not do so until 1971, the year he retired from politics. Since then Australia has taken part in what is a complex “network of networks” linking over 40,000 senior public servants from many of the most influential states via some 200 committees spanning a wide range of policy areas. Yet Australian scholars have paid little attention to the OECD and to its effect upon Australia. Our essay is a first step in remedying this gap. Using both archival sources and interviews with public servants, we examine Australia's reasons for taking up OECD membership and assess its impact on policymaking since, the most obvious of which has been upon policy learning. We also ask about Australia's impact on the OECD.     

“Perfidy Afoot!” Connor,the IEA and the Loans Affair

When the International Energy Agency (IEA) was established out of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1974, Australia was not among its founding members. Indeed, it was opposed to its formation and even contemplated voting in the OECD to block its establishment. A single negative vote under the “mutual agreement” rule would have done so. This paper, based on archival research, explores the reasons for this course of action and shows that the decision was linked to the resource nationalism at the time of Minister Rex Connor and his fear that supporting it might jeopardise his attempts to raise non-equity finance in the Middle East. This article shows that this previously unanalysed decision was connected to what became known as the “Loans Affair” that brought about Connor's demise and contributed to the downfall of the Whitlam Government.     

Multi-level and multi-arena governance: the limits of integration and the possibilities of forum shopping

Global governance occurs through a large number of issue-area regimes that constitute multiple arenas of governance at multiple levels. This paper draws upon established literature from public administration to show that such fragmentation is unavoidable, because it occurs even in governance at the national level. Moreover, while such fragmentation undoubtedly carries with it problems, it also brings advantages, such as redundancy which makes it less likely that blame avoidance will result in issues being overlooked. The existence of multiple arenas also makes possible the phenomenon of ‘forum shopping’, which allows entrepreneurial actors to advance (or block) the development of international agreements. Using primarily examples from environmental governance, but with some comparative examples from other issue areas, this paper reflects upon both the threats and opportunities this reality presents, suggesting that the prevailing fragmentation of governance at once presents not just an obstacle to global governance, but opportunities for improving global governance—opportunities that would not occur if a single regime enjoyed a monopoly on governing capacity.     

'Problems in International Environmental Governance' or 'A Policy Analyst Looks at the World…. this Being a Tale of How the Hopes of Mice and Men in Geneva Are Dashed in Canberra'

Concern about international environmental governance has shifted from the problems in having multilateral environmental agreements adopted to trying to ensure that the agreements which are negotiated are implemented, and that they produce positive environmental outcomes. This article argues that features of the international policy process which assist domestic policy adoption, especially scientific reductionism and moral suasion, can undermine the chances of policy implementation. This is often because business interests which are marginalised during policy adoption are more influential at the domestic level at which policy must be implemented. This asymmmetry is explained by suggesting that — rather than their being 'two-level games' (as Putnam suggested) — there are (in Lowi's terms) distinctive arenas of power at the the international and national levels. Improving policy effectiveness requires the distribution of power in each arena to be made more symmetrical.