Democratization,International Knowledge Institutions,and Global Governance

The central problem of democracy has long been theorized as how to place appropriate constraints on the responsible exercise of power. Today, this problem is most acute in global governance. This article examines the rapid rise in the creation of international knowledge institutions, arguing that these institutions reflect a growing effort by nations and publics to assert democratic constraints on the on the global exercise of power through their ability to structure processes of reasoning and deliberation in global society. Specifically, the article argues for the need to attend carefully to processes of knowledge‐making in international institutions, including the roles of international institutions in setting standards for the exercise of reasoning, their contributions to the making of global kinds through their work in classifying and reclassifying the objects of international discourse, and through their roles in opening up and constraining participation in international deliberation. The article concludes that the construction and deployment of policy‐relevant knowledge are a significant source of power in their own right in global governance that need to be subject to their own democratic critique.     

Competition and Selection in Municipal Bond Sales: Evidence from Missouri

This article describes the results of an interest cost analysis of local government debt issuance in the State of Missouri. In Missouri the vast majority of municipal bonds are sold on a “no bid” basis. We discuss the theoretical arguments for and against competition and selection. Then we determine the degree to which cost differences exist while correcting for any potential selection bias. We use data on local government general obligation bonds sold from May 2004 to May 2005 provided by the Missouri State Auditor's office. We find that this substantial lack of competition imposes significant costs on Missouri governments.     

On prediction in political science

This article discusses recent moves in political science that emphasise predicting future events rather than theoretically explaining past ones or understanding empirical generalisations. Two types of prediction are defined: pragmatic, and scientific. The main aim of political science is explanation, which requires scientific prediction. Scientific prediction does not necessarily entail pragmatic prediction nor does it necessarily refer to the future, though both are desiderata for political science. Pragmatic prediction is not necessarily explanatory, and emphasising pragmatic prediction will lead to disappointment, as it will not always help in understanding how to intervene to change future outcomes, and policy makers are likely to be disappointed by its time-scale.     

The Chinese Ant and the American Grasshopper

The world’s top saver and its biggest spender will both benef it if their financial attitudes show more convergence. CHINA is like the ant and America is like the grasshopper.     

OBSERVATIONS ON POLICE UNDERCOVER WORK*

Law enforcement officers are dependent upon citizens to alert them to criminal violations of the law. When citizens do not willingly communicate information to the police or cannot be induced to do so, police officers themselves adopt fictitious identities of various types. This paper explores police undercover work, a form of covert law enforcement used to gather information about conduct external to the organization. Through interviews with supervisors and practitioners, the benefits and liabilities of the assignment for the officers and the organization are presented. The work enables the police to investigate citizens who are not suspected of criminal activity and therefore lends itself to abuse. The practice itself demands attention as the lack of operational guidelines, standardless selection of operatives, and loose supervision imperil the safety of officers and the rights of citizens.