Migration and geopolitical preferences

This paper investigates the impact of work experience abroad on migrants’ geopolitical preferences. For this purpose, I analyze representative survey data from Moldova, a country caught in an ideological battle between Russia and the West, with high emigration rates to both destinations. In a first step, I show that return migrants from the West are significantly more likely to support European Union (EU) accession than non-migrants, while return migrants from the East are more likely to support closer ties with Russia, controlling for economic, demographic, and ethnic confounding factors. In a second step, I use district-level variation in migrant networks as an instrument for individual migration. Second-stage regressions show that work experience in the West increases support for EU accession, while no evidence of causal effects is found for work experience in the East. Differences in information exposure and migration policies between the EU and Russia may explain this asymmetry.     

Community influence as an explanatory factor why Roma children get little schooling

Public Choice - Parents who experience poverty and who want to provide their children with an escape route can be expected to encourage and support their progeny’s education. The evidence...     

Reputation concerns in aid conditionality

This paper analyzes the conditions under which reputation concerns induce donors and recipients to respect conditional aid contracts. Donors enforce conditionality if the benefits of improving compliance in future contracts thanks to a tougher reputation exceed the costs of resisting disbursement pressure. The level of conditionality enforcement is optimal if all the costs and benefits of reputation building are internalized by the decision maker. This condition is not satisfied at the World Bank and the IMF, where enforcement is decentralized to country departments which do not internalize the benefits of a tough reputation on other departments. Recipients comply with conditionality if the costs of implementing conditionality are lower than the benefits of securing tranche release thanks to compliance and obtaining future contracts thanks to a good reputation for compliance. Reputation concerns increase recipients’ incentives to comply only if there is some uncertainty on future aid commitments, which is true for successive single-tranche contracts, but not for multi-tranche contracts.