Power and changing modes of governance in the euro crisis

Which European Union actors are most powerful in the governance of the euro crisis? The euro crisis has reignited the classic debate between intergovernmentalists, who tend to stress the coercive power of dominant member states in the European Council, and supranationalists, who maintain that through the use of institutional power, the Commission, and the European Central Bank turned out the “winners” of the crisis. This article argues that euro crisis governance is best understood not just in terms of one form of power but instead as evolving through different constellations of coercive, institutional, and ideational power that favored different EU actors over the course of the crisis, from the initial fast‐burning phase (2010–2012), where the coercive and ideational power of Northern European member states in the European Council was strongest, to the slow‐burning phase (2012–2016), when greater influence was afforded supranational actors through the use of ideational and institutional power.     

Why we need bricoleurs to foster robust governance solutions in turbulent times

The public sector frequently confronts a heightened societal turbulence triggered by an increasing number of unpredictable and disruptive economic, political, and environmental crises. How can the public sector respond to this challenge? This article argues, first, that to continue to provide relevant solutions, public governance must be robust in the sense of adapting and innovating policies, programs, and services in ways that facilitate the achievement of basic public ambitions, functions, and values in the face of challenges, stressors, and threats. Second, to build robust governance, public managers must engage in bricolage and become bricoleurs in order to flexibly combine elements from competing and co-existent public governance paradigms. Doing so necessitates the construction of institutions conducive to bricolage, that is, institutions that are characterized by a high degree of flexibility that allows for experimentation; institutions that foster inclusive deliberation, knowledge sharing and joint learning; and institutions that balance centralization with distributed agency.     

Of paradigms and power: British economic policy making since Thatcher

How do ruling policy paradigms persist over time and why do they often undergo significant internal ideational changes? While the impact of Peter Hall's approach to policy paradigms on the study of governance has been immense, there is a burgeoning consensus that a “Kuhnian” understanding of paradigms makes punctuated equilibrium style shifts the only game in town. While Hall's approach can account for inter‐paradigm change with reference to exogenous shocks, it does not allow for significant ideational shifts to occur intra‐paradigm. To remedy this, we place ideational power dynamics at the heart of the study of policy paradigms. We demonstrate the general applicability of our approach by examining the evolution of British macroeconomic policy‐making since 1990. We show how key policy‐makers were able to employ their institutional and ideational power to reinterpret and redefine the dominant neoliberal understanding of the economy to match their own specific ideas and policy priorities.     

Sexual Harassment Reconsidered: The Forgotten Grey Zone

The concept of sexual harassment in the Nordic countries and the European Union (EU) is an important tool for creating gender-equitable workplaces. This article contains an analysis of the conceptual ambiguity of sexual harassment with reference to: firstly, the lack of clarity in terms of the relation between the subjective (the perspective of the harassed individual) and the objective (legal assessment) aspects; secondly, the diffuse scope of the objective assessment; thirdly, the attribution of too much importance to the subject’s perception. Even though the concept of sexual harassment classifies behaviours depending on individual interpretations, the legal construction recognizes the individual’s perception in a flexible manner. If the victim does not interpret the abuse as sexual harassment, then it is not. However, if the victim does consider it sexual harassment, it will not necessarily be interpreted as such. The consequence of the three-fold ambiguity of the concept is the creation of a gender-equality grey zone. Problematic behaviours in workplaces may pass as acceptable and “normal”. Subjective perception matters only when it confirms an objective incident. Defining sexual harassment in solely objective terms and determining which gender-related issues prevent equality would result in similar dilemmas, one of which would be the diminishing of those individuals who are subject to harassment. It is imperative to question the dogma that has the victim deciding whether a situation might be considered sexual harassment because: firstly, the subjective perceptions of the victim seem to be of minor importance in changing negative gender structures in workplaces; and, secondly, potential victims of harassment tend to interpret the situation as something else. Furthermore, since the current definition of sexual harassment is characterized by a preoccupation with behaviours and not with structural dimensions, the definition may actually counteract its purpose of increasing gender equality.