How parties and interest groups protect their ties: The case of lobbying laws

Scholars have recently shown renewed interest in the study of party-interest group ties. According to previous studies, traditional ties between parties and organized interest are a matter of the past. Globalization, deindustrialization, and neoliberalism have posed serious challenges to their survival. Recent contributions suggest that, while these ties are indeed weaker than before, they have not disappeared. How do parties and groups protect their ties? This paper attempts to provide a partial, though often neglected, answer: their relationship survives when both actors work together to protect it. While previous literature identified regulatory policies, such as ethics and transparency regulations, as detrimental to party-group ties, their introduction is erroneously treated as independent from these ties. Through a comparative case study of the introduction of lobbying laws in Austria, Australia, and Ireland, this paper suggests that parties and groups shape the content of lobbying regulations in such a way to protect their relationship.     

the impact of constitutional structures and collective and competitive veto points on income inequality in industrialized democracies

This paper presents the first systematic, empirical examination of the impact of constitutional structures on income inequality among eighteen OECD countries. Our pooled time series/cross–sectional panel analysis (n = 18, t = 2) reveals that consensual political institutions are systematically related to lower income inequalities while the reverse is true for majoritarian political institutions. We also make a crucial distinction between 'collective' and 'competitive' veto points. Our multiple regression results provide strong evidence that collective veto points depress income inequalities while competitive veto points tend to widen the inequality of incomes. Thus, some institutional veto points have constraining effects on policy while others have 'enabling' effects.     

An institutional dinosaur: Austrian corporatism in the post‐industrial age

While the Austrian party system, based on a competitive electoral logic, is able to absorb the wide‐ranging changes created by modernisation in the last 25 years, the corporatist system, based on a ‘protective’ logic insulates itself from societal change. Corporatist organisations are designed to create societal stability. As societies experience dynamic change, the corporatist institutional structure not only becomes obsolete but also hinders evolutionary institutional adaptation to a changing society. Corporatist institutions are increasingly ‘out of touch’ with popular demands. The sources for this maladaptation reside within the central institutional features of corporatism themselves: organisation of interests in peak associations, compulsory membership to three of the four ‘strategic actors’, and the decision rule of unanimity.     

The impact of constitutional structures and collective and competitive veto points on income inequality in industrialized democracies

Abstract This paper presents the first systematic, empirical examination of the impact of constitutional structures on income inequality among eighteen OECD countries. Our pooled time series/cross–sectional panel analysis (n = 18, t = 2) reveals that consensual political institutions are systematically related to lower income inequalities while the reverse is true for majoritarian political institutions. We also make a crucial distinction between 'collective' and 'competitive' veto points. Our multiple regression results provide strong evidence that collective veto points depress income inequalities while competitive veto points tend to widen the inequality of incomes. Thus, some institutional veto points have constraining effects on policy while others have 'enabling' effects.