How to lose a majority: the competition in single–member districts

Abstract Few observers expected that the 1966 elections in Italy would yield a clear–cut outcome. Even fewer people expected that, after the disastrous results of the previous elections, the centre–left coalition would be able to gain a majority of seats in both branches of Parliament. Yet this is precisely what happened on 21 April 1996. This article tries to explain the comeback of the 1994 losers by focusing on three factors which have changed the electoral balance between the two major coalitions in the single–member districts. The first factor was the ability of the centre–left coalition (Ulivo–RC) to broaden its range while its major rival (the Polo) lost key allies. The result has been a more competitive stand of centre–left candidates, particularly in the North. The Polo lost the support of the Lega Nord and suffered the split of the Movimento Sociale on its right. These defections, along with others, led to the loss of a considerable number of seats. Finally, the Polo also suffered from the defection of a considerable number of its voters who voted for one of the parties of the centre–right coalition in the proportional arena, but refused to vote for the Polo candidate in the single–member districts. We conclude by suggesting a number of hypotheses that could explain this split–ticket phenomenon.     

Introduction: The Italian parliamentary elections of 1996 – Competition and Transition

European Journal of Political Research -     

How to lose a majority: the competition in single–member districts

Few observers expected that the 1966 elections in Italy would yield a clear–cut outcome. Even fewer people expected that, after the disastrous results of the previous elections, the centre–left coalition would be able to gain a majority of seats in both branches of Parliament. Yet this is precisely what happened on 21 April 1996. This article tries to explain the comeback of the 1994 losers by focusing on three factors which have changed the electoral balance between the two major coalitions in the single–member districts. The first factor was the ability of the centre–left coalition (Ulivo–RC) to broaden its range while its major rival (the Polo) lost key allies. The result has been a more competitive stand of centre–left candidates, particularly in the North. The Polo lost the support of the Lega Nord and suffered the split of the Movimento Sociale on its right. These defections, along with others, led to the loss of a considerable number of seats. Finally, the Polo also suffered from the defection of a considerable number of its voters who voted for one of the parties of the centre–right coalition in the proportional arena, but refused to vote for the Polo candidate in the single–member districts. We conclude by suggesting a number of hypotheses that could explain this split–ticket phenomenon.     

Majoritarian miracles and the question of party system change

The 1996 elections in Italy may be evaluated using a dual means of inquiry: which novelties (or the absence thereof) appear with respect to 1994? And, how many and in what way (if any) do they contribute to the definition of a new type of party system and a new logic of political competition? As regards the former perspective, we address three questions which represented fundamental issues at the time of the vote: (a) Would the new electoral system manage to provide a clear and stable governmental majority where it had failed to do so in 1994? (b) Would the political parties and alliances have changed their offers to the voters? (c) Would the voters have changed their behaviour, adapting it not just to any new offers, but especially to the logic of majoritarian competition? Regarding the latter perspective, these questions can be amalgamated into a single enquiry: Do the 1996 elections constitute a decisive step in the direction of a new party system, or are they a step backwards, or do they simply present a static picture?