Comparing political systems: Establishing similarities and dissimilarities

Abstract. Comparative political analysis at the macro-level of political systems can reduce the inevitably high complexity of such comparisons by the systematic matching or contrasting of cases, depending on the particular problem. Such 'most similar systems' or 'most different systems' designs, in Przeworski & Teune's terminology, thus constitute one of the major ways out of the usual 'small N—many variables' dilemma. This paper proposes a detailed and comprehensive method to establish such similarities and dissimilarities in a systematic and at all stages transparent way. The examples chosen refer to an analysis of the conditions of survival or breakdown of democratic systems in the inter-war period in Europe.     

If things can only get worse: Anticipation of enlargement in European Union legislative politics

Anticipation is a central feature of political behaviour. It has an impact on actors' choices and can change the timing of decisions. This article analyses anticipation in legislative politics. After delineating different objects as well as consequences of anticipation theoretically, a set of hypotheses about anticipatory behaviour in EU decision-making is derived. In particular, it is asked whether the EU Council anticipates the arrival of new Member States and how this affects legislative output. The theory is tested by estimating count models using a dataset that contains information on all binding EU legislation from 1976 to 2007. Covering five enlargement rounds, evidence is presented for anticipatory behaviour in EU legislative politics.     

Situational Contracting: Building Reciprocity between Rights and Obligations

Individualism, cultural pluralism, and pressures from globalization are putting a strain on matching demand and supply of public services. Citizens want tailor‐made solutions, professionals in delivery systems need degrees of freedom to customize supply, and complexity brings along information asymmetries and strategic behavior. All this calls for a new look at interactive governance. This article develops a mode of situational contracting that reveals preference at the level of the individual actor, generates trust in mutual adjustment, and creates scope for customization and innovation in public management. It sets out a strategy, presents results of an early application in the Netherlands, and suggests further applications.     

Determinants of democratic successes and failures in Africa

Abstract.  This article, first, identifies democratic, authoritarian and 'praetorian' political system types in Africa on the basis of major current indicators. It then systematically tests a broad variety of hypotheses concerning the historical, social-structural, socio-economic, political and institutional determinants and performance characteristics of these system types. A macro-quantitative synopsis attempts to identify the most 'parsimonious' overall constellations of factors in this regard. This is supplemented by a macro-qualitative analysis of major 'conjunctural' conditions identifying the main groups of cases and their determining factors in a 'contradiction-free' manner. The conclusions point to the decisive importance of 'governance' aspects in the future.     

Control Modes in the Age of Transnational Governance

The article starts with the observation that there are overlaps in, so far, largely unrelated research programs concerned with the legalization in international relations, on the one hand, and transnational regulation and governance, on the other. The analysis of the literature at the interface between the "fourth strata of the geology of international law" and the "governance in the age of regulation" literatures reveals a substantial common interest in structures of transnational regulatory governance. At the same time, the theoretical toolkit of both strands of literature does not match the task of coping analytically with structures and processes in the overlapping realm. To sharpen the analytical edge, the article elaborates hierarchy, market, community, and design as four ideal types of control modes in transnational regulatory spaces. The application of this model to the empirical analysis of a number of regimes underpins the observation that control frequently occurs in hybrid regulatory constellations involving public and private actors across national and international levels. A key example concerns the prominence of domestic regulatory regimes in underpinning transnational governance processes, where national rules achieve extraterritorial effect as much through competitive as through hierarchical mechanisms.