Die Dimensionalität der Reichstage der Weimarer Republik von 1920 bis 1932

We analyse the dimensionality and the positioning of parliamentary party groups and single MPs in the parliament (“Reichstag”) of the Weimar Republic on the basis of all recorded votes between 1920 and 1932. On the basis of studies on the milieu-boundedness of German parties and theoretical accounts on the dimensionality of parliaments in general we develop hypotheses regarding the number and characteristics of dimensions that structured voting behaviour in the Weimar Reichstag. The expectations are tested with a full sample of recorded parliamentary votes. The results, which are based on item response models, show that two dimensions structured MP’s decision-making: this is, first, an economic left-right axis and, secondly, a pro vs. contra Weimar Republic dimension. Additionally, our results provide support for recent studies on intra-party conflict inside the German national conservatives.     

Partisanship,Ministers, and Biotechnology Policy

Research in public policy and political economy has provided many insights in the evolution of public resistance against genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in the last two decades. But how does the partisan composition of a government, its programmatic orientation and the allocation of cabinet offices affect policy making in this specific area? We argue that the regulation of GMOs is determined by the ideological orientation of governments and the presence of parties with a specific ideological background in the cabinet. In addition, we hypothesize that the parties' control over relevant cabinet posts matter for GMO regulation. We test our hypotheses by using an innovative dataset that contains information on biotechnology regulation outputs of European governments in the time period from 1996 until 2013, the partisan composition and policy‐area specific positions of governments, and the party affiliation of key cabinet actors. The results show that the presence of a Christian democratic party in a cabinet increases the chances of a ban on biotech crops, in particular if it controls the Ministry of the Environment.     

Party Competition and Government Formation in Germany: Business as Usual or New Patterns?

The process of coalition formation following the 2017 Bundestag election was the most difficult in German post-war history. For the first time, Germany saw negotiations fail, a minority government being discussed as a real possibility, and the federal president involved as formateur in coalition politics. The aim of this contribution is to explain why government formation was so intricate after the 2017 election. To this end, we trace patterns of party politics and the development of the German party system since 2013. We then study general patterns of government formation at the regional and national levels since the 1990s and evaluate whether these have changed with the advent of the right-wing populist party, Alternative for Germany. Our analysis of the 2017–2018 government formation is based on a novel expert survey of the policy profiles of German parties on various issue dimensions, conducted in 2017. The results show that the continuation of the incumbent coalition government of Christian and Social Democrats was the most likely outcome, and that the Social Democrats were indeed able to enforce a surpassing share of their policy positions in the final negotiation rounds.     

Der Einfluss von Mandatstyp und Wahlkreiseigenschaften auf die inhaltlichen Positionen in Parlamentsreden: Eine Untersuchung anhand der parlamentarischen Debatten im Deutschen Bundestag von 1998 bis 2002

Giving speeches in parliament is a key element of elected representatives for signalling their policy agenda and their ideological positions to their party and their electorate. Taking a specific programmatic position might increase the chances of an MP to get re‐nominated and to win again a seat in the legislature. In this paper, we build on approaches of responsive behaviour of political actors and on principal agent theories and ask which variables can explain the programmatic positions adopted by MPs in their speeches. To answer our research question, we collected all speeches related to economic policy issues given by members of the German Bundestag in the time period between 1998 and 2002. We estimated their individual policy positions with computerised methods of content analysis. We combine this data with information on the characteristics of MPs, their position in party, parliament and government and, in addition, with the socioeconomic structure and former election results within the MPs’ constituency. The results show that German MPs take the characteristics and the economic problem pressure of their constituencies into account when speaking in parliament, so that there is empirical evidence for responsive and vote‐seeking behaviour of German MPs. In addition, political and institutional factors like the membership in committees or in (former) cabinets and the way how an MP was elected – directly or by party list – play a role for the degree of MP's programmatic deviation from the party line.     

The 2009 Elections in Schleswig-Holstein: Polarised Electoral Campaign,Exceptional Election Results,and an Unspectacular Process of Government Formation

The elections for the Schleswig-Holstein Landtag were held on 27 September 2009. After conflicts between the governing parties the Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Social Democrats (SPD), Prime Minister Carstensen had ended the ‘grand coalition’ and called for early elections, one year earlier than scheduled. The electoral campaign centred on the divide between the Christian Democrats who favoured a coalition with the Liberals, and the Social Democrats who competed for a majority together with the Greens. The elections resulted in large shifts in party strength. Christian and Social Democrats together lost about 22 percentage points of votes, while most of the smaller parliamentary parties attained their best election results in Schleswig-Holstein state elections ever. CDU and FDP gained a majority of seats and formed a coalition that re-elected Carstensen into office on 27 October. Using concepts from coalition theory, our analysis shows that a Christian–Liberal coalition was indeed the most likely outcome of the government formation process.     

The Unequal Distribution of Speaking Time in Parliamentary‐Party Groups

Parliamentary debates provide an arena where Members of Parliament (MPs) present, challenge, or defend public policies. However, the “plenary bottleneck” allows the party leadership to decide who participates in a debate. We argue that in this decision the timing of a debate matters: in proximity of elections, the leadership should be concerned with maintaining its brand name and therefore restrict floor access, in particular if the debate is salient for the respective party. We evaluate our hypotheses in a cross‐country study drawing on a novel data set covering all speeches given during one or two legislative terms in six European parliaments. We find that the electoral cycle matters for the distribution of speaking time: Party leaders do restrict parliamentary speechmaking to a smaller number of MPs at the end of the term. This has important implications for our understanding of parliaments as an electoral arena and for our understanding of intraparty politics.     

Gaining new insights by going local: determinants of coalition formation in mixed democratic polities

We develop a simple spatial model suggesting that Members of Parliament strive for the inclusion of the head of state’s party in coalitions formed in mixed democratic polities, and that parliamentary parties try to assemble coalitions that minimize the ideological distance to the head of state. We identify the German local level of government as functionally equivalent to a parliamentary setting, such that the directly elected mayor has competencies similar to a president in a mixed national polity. Our findings show that the party affiliation of the head of state is a key factor considered by party members in the legislature when forming coalitions: coalitions in the legislature are more likely to form if they include the party of the head of the executive branch. Furthermore, the policy preferences of the head of the executive branch matter for the legislators’ behavior in the coalition formation process: the smaller the ideological distance between the position of a coalition and the position of the head of state, the more likely a coalition is to be formed.