Constraints, states, and wars

Abstract. The rational choice assumption is already disputable at the individual level of decisionmaking. At the level of collective decision-making unitary rational action is an unrealistic assumption. It neglects the transitivity of collective preferences issue, the logic of collective action and freeriding, the agency problem, and the human tendency to agree with each other irrespective of the facts. While unitary rational action is rejected as a basis for theorizing on international relations and war, the idea of decision-making under constraints seems as valid in the interstate context as in economics. The most important constraints on national security decision-making are the anarchical character of the international system and the corresponding need for self-help, the security and the territorial delimitation dilemmas, the presence or absence of plausible blueprints for victory, and the presence or absence of domestic constraints on bellicosity. A simple explanatory model of war built on these ideas is suggested and tested with dyadic data for the 1962–1980 period. In addition, there is some discussion of why collective security is doomed to fail, and why hegemony rather than balance improve the prospects of peace.     

The Social Courts in the German Democratic Republic—Bodies of Criminal Justice

[Editor's Note] The author discusses the structure, function, and success of the social courts in the German Democratic Republic.     

Penal Law Among Socialist Countries

[Editor's Note: Dr. Erich Buchholz has been a regular contributor to this Journal since 1977. He is Dean of the Faculty of Law, Humboldt-Universitat Zu Berlin, German Democratic Republic (GDR), and also permanent member of the Presidency of the Council for Scientific Investigation of Legal Science at the Academy of Science of the GDR. He is also a member of the International Association of Penal Law. Dr. Bucholz has published many articles, chapters, and books not only in socialist nations but also in the West. Dr. Buchholz submitted a book-review article Le droit pénal comparé des pays socialistes, by Igor Andrejew, Paris 1981. Edition A. pedone, p. 162, which we translated to read “A Comparison of the Penal Law Among Socialist Countries.” The book-review article was further revised by the Journal's Associate Editor, Dr. Peter Zoller. Any reader who wishes to receive an original of the book-review should write to the Editorial Office.]     

Some Aspects of the Development of the Penalty System in the German Democratic Republic

Data indicated that juvenile delinquency increased dramatically recently in the Republic of China. This paper seeks to explain this phenomenon by invoking Hirschi's Social Control Theory. However, such an explanation can be offered only when there is empirical evidence to verify the applicability of Social Control Theory to Chinese society.

Though Social Control Theory has received great empirical support from many American studies, cross-cultural verification remains to be seen. The study described here intends to test Social Control Theory by using self-reported data collected from 3717 Chinese junior and senior high school students of northern Taiwan. Major correlates of self-reported delinquency are presented and discussed. Apparently, Social Control Theory received much support from the Chinese data, while both strain theory and subculture deviance theory were not verified. Social Control Theory is said to be the most appropriate theory to explain the origin as well as the increase of juvenile delinquency in Chinese society.     

Sectoral reallocation, distributional coalitions and the welfare state as determinants of economic growth rates in industrialized democracies

Abstract. This paper investigates three propositions about economic growth. It rejects the proposition that differences in the size of the agricultural sector or in opportunities to reallocate resources from this sector to other sectors of the economy significantly contribute to the explanation of differential growth rates among industrialized democracies. It supports Olson's proposition that long lasting democracies suffer from an accumulation of distributional coalitions whose rent-seeking activities retard economic growth. It also supports the proposition that the welfare state contributes to economic decline. Technically, this paper applies cross-sectional and pooled regression analyses of growth rates on employment in agriculture as a percentage of civilian employment, age of democracy, and social security transfers as a percentage of GDP. Data refer to the 1960–82 period and 19 nations.