Fairness and Rejection in the Ultimatum Bargaining Game

The ultimatum game is a standard instrument for laboratory experimentalists.It has been replicated in a large number of environments andpoints to special considerations for fairness. Although it hasbeen popular in the experimental community, researchers havenot harnessed all the statistical power they should to evaluatethe dynamics at work in this type of a bargaining game. Thisresearch uses two planned treatments, the first involving asignaling condition concerning a subject's "type," and the seconda price effect built into the structure of the game. We findthat there are no significant main effects as a result of thesignaling condition of a subject's type, but that there arestrong effects as a result of the different payoff parameters.Using a variety of multivariate models we find important, nonobviousinteractions with the gender of the subjects. The lesson thatwe take away from this research is that experimentalists canlearn more from data collected in the tightly controlled laboratoryenvironment by using statistical techniques that complementtheir research designs.     

Gender and Negotiation in the Small: Are Women (Perceived to Be) More Cooperative than Men?

We surveyed research by experimental economists that examines gender differences in negotiation in the context of two simple, two-player games. Our purpose is to uncover empirical regularities in the results that might be useful to teachers or practitioners of negotiation. In the dictator game, one player unilaterally determines the division of a fixed amount of money. In the ultimatum game, one player offers a division and the other must accept or reject that offer; if rejected, both players receive a zero payoff. The results have shown that, on balance, women tend to be more egalitarian than men, to expect and ask for less in the negotiation. Women also seem to be more responsive to the context of a negotiation and are less likely to fail to reach an agreement than men. These differences are small, however, in comparison with differences in expectations about what women and men will do. We conclude that stereotyping is alive and well in negotiations and that this can help or hinder negotiation outcomes, depending on the context.     

Counterterrorism strategies in the lab

We conduct experiments to test the collective action dilemmas associated with defensive and proactive counterterror strategies. Defensive policies are associated with creating public ??bads' (e.g., a commons) whereas proactive policies are akin to the voluntary provision of public goods. When combined, the inefficiency of collective action is exacerbated, resulting in a situation known as a Prisoner??s Dilemma squared (PD²). Deterministic versus probabilistic equivalent versions of the associated externalities are compared within a laboratory setting. Experimental results reveal that the collective action problem associated with counterterror strategies is deepened in uncertain environments, and is indeed a robust regularity that is not easily overcome; as individuals gain more experience, they become even more self-interested.