The Rise of Citizen Groups within the Administration and Parliament in Switzerland

This research note presents three newly interconnected and expanded datasets on interest groups’ (IGs) access to the Swiss political decision‐making process: (1) extra‐parliamentary committee seats occupied by IGs (1980, 2000, 2010), (2) parliamentary (committee) seats occupied by IG representatives (1992‐2015), and (3) consultation replies submitted by IGs (2008‐11). We show that the Swiss system of interest intermediation adapted to the multiplication and organizational consolidation of citizen groups, which defend non‐producer interests and do not provide selective benefits to their members (e.g. environmental groups). The share of access granted to citizen groups has increased in both the administration and parliament, across all federal departments and most legislative committees. Moreover, citizen groups benefit from a larger share of access in the recently revitalized parliament, compared to the administration. This suggests that economic groups’ decline in power is also related to the rise of citizen groups.     

District magnitude and representation of the majority’s preferences: Evidence from popular and parliamentary votes

Representatives have more effective incentives to cater to the preferences of the majority of citizens when they are elected in districts with few rather than many seats. We investigate this hypothesis empirically by matching Swiss members of parliament’s voting behavior on legislative proposals with real referendum outcomes on the same issues for the years 1996 to 2008. We thus identify the impact of district magnitude on representatives’ incentives to adhere to citizens’ revealed preferences. We find systematic, statistically significant and economically relevant evidence that individual representatives from districts with few seats vote more often in line with majority preferences.     

Interests groups in Parliament: Exploring MPs’ interest affiliations (2000‐2011)

This research note presents an innovative dataset of Swiss MPs’ interest ties between 2000‐2011. The longitudinal analysis shows that the average number of interest ties per MP has more than doubled: from 3.5 in 2000 to 7.6 in 2011. Since the mid‐2000s, public interest groups have accounted for approximately one out of two ties between MPs and interest groups, showing the strongest increase during the period. However, when looking at the most present individual groups, important business groups dominate and appear well connected with the governmental parties of the political right. Finally, interest groups are also able to forge themselves a strategic presence within the parliamentary committees that are the most relevant for their policy issues. Next research steps include the assessment of the (un)biased access of interest groups to the parliamentary venue and their policy influence.     

District magnitude and representation of the majority’s preferences—a reply and new perspectives

We reply to the comment of John Carey and Simon Hix on our original contribution entitled “District Magnitude and Representation of the Majority’s Preferences: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Popular and Parliamentary Votes” in Public Choice 151:585–610 (2012). District magnitude does not necessarily affect deviations between political representatives and their district voters in a strictly monotonic way but monotonicity is upheld for deviations between representatives and the national majority. We provide new perspectives and caution against evaluating electoral systems by focusing on individual politicians’ behavior but neglecting aggregation effects.     

Political Economists and Political Scientists ‐ What Are the Benefits to Economists From Closer Interaction?

This paper discusses how a closer interaction with Political Scientists could impact on Swiss Political Economists by concentrating on four specific hypotheses. The first thesis evaluates how increased interdisciplinary interaction affects the incentives of Swiss Political Economists. It somewhat pessimistically posits that interdisciplinary interaction does not necessarily inseminate the work of Political Economists. The second thesis is more optimistic and discusses some aspects of the politico‐economic process which have been neglected so far in Political Economics but could be integrated thanks to the interaction with Political Scientists. The third thesis proposes that Swiss Political Economists should learn from Political Scientists to be more critical of present Swiss institutions. The fourth thesis proposes that Political Economists and Political Scientists should not only discuss the application of economic reasoning to politics. They should also investigate which governance mechanisms can be transferred from the polity to the economy.     

Independent and competing agencies: An effective way to control government

Controlling government is a primary focus of the politico-economic literature. Recently, various political institutions have been analyzed from this perspective, most importantly balanced budget rules, fiscal federalism, and direct democracy. However, one type of institution has been neglected so far: elected competitors to the government. Such institutional competition between the government and an independent agency can be found at the Swiss local level, where finance Commissions compete with the government. In some parts of Switzerland, local finance commissions can ex ante criticize government projects and bring alternative policy proposals onto the political agenda, which are then voted on by the citizens. Thus, they become strong competitors to the government. We econometrically investigate this institutional setting by comparing the 26 Swiss cantons. We find the power of the local finance commission to have an economically relevant, statistically significant and robust negative effect on the tax burden and on public expenditures.     

Rational moralists: The role of fairness in democratic economic politics

In this paper, we empirically test for the influence of fairness considerations on the willingness to redistribute income in private and in democratic decisions. In contrast to standard explanations of income redistribution, our theory takes into account that prices shift decisively as we move from the sphere of private contributions to politics. At the polls, it is nearly costless to observe social norms. Therefore, we expect individuals to behave more fairly in the political sphere than in the market place. We present experimental evidence which is consistent with this hypothesis. In distributive struggles, social norms moderate the inclination of human beings to behave like ‘gangsters’.     

Random errors, dirty information, and politics

Rational voters' assessments of candidates and policy proposals are unbiased, but affected by random errors. "Clean" information decreases these errors, while "dirty" information increases them. In politics, most voting procedures weigh random individual errors asymmetrically. Thus, such errors do not counterbalance one another in the aggregate. They systematically affect politics. This illuminates the roles of political propaganda and interest groups. It helps to explain various puzzles in Public Choice, e.g., the frequent use of inefficient policy instruments. Institutional conditions are identified that shape the aggregate impact of individual errors and the politicians' incentives to produce dirty information.     

Anomalies in Political Economy

Results in cognitive psychology and experimental economics indicate that under identifiable conditions individuals do not act in an economically rational way. These results are important for Political Economy. Anomalies appear in the behaviour of voters, politicans and administrators. Economic markets do not fully eliminate anomalies in the aggregation process. It is shown that political aggregation by democracy, bargaining or bureaucracy may weaken or strengthen such individual anomalies. Moreover, institutions can partially be interpreted as endogenously emerging as a result of individuals' demands to cope with anomalies.     

More equal than others: Assessing economic and citizen groups' access across policymaking venues

This study assesses whether economic interest groups (business associations and trade unions) enjoy better access to the policymaking process than citizen groups. It compares the interest group population in Switzerland with those sets of groups present in the administrative and legislative venues. The study devises an aggregate measure of access to policymaking as a whole, which weights access according to different venues' importance. It theorizes the granting of access as a sequential process. Policymakers first decide whether to grant any access at all (selection stage) and then decide on the amount of access (allocation stage). Empirical evidence shows that policymakers do not discriminate between economic and citizen groups at the selection stage, but that they subsequently grant more access to economic groups. These findings qualify existing research, which interprets economic groups' superior access as the resilience of neo‐corporatism, while also questioning the pluralizing effect of multiple policymaking venues.