‘Toys’ and ‘Whispers’ in ‘16‐land’: SOE and Ireland, 1940–1942

This article explores SOE plans to organise stay behind parties in neutral Ireland in cooperation with Irish army officers, in anticipation of a successful German invasion, as well as efforts to prepare for sabotage operations and to plant rumours through its agent Roddy Keith, and later through the British press attache John Betjeman. SOE's ambitions were opposed both by MI5 and SIS. MI5 wished to protect its own links with Irish intelligence, while SIS feared for the security of its covert Irish networks (which in fact were already penetrated). The consequent rows drew in C, Sir Frank Nelson, and other senior figures. They were resolved by Churchill, who felt that to provide the Irish with war material would only encourage them in their neutrality policy. His verdict was taken as an instruction to SOE to quit Ireland.     

‘A poor thing but our own’: The Joint Intelligence Committee and Ireland, 1965–72

This article explores the role of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in assessing the development of the Northern Ireland crisis from the mid-1960s until the imposition of direct rule in 1972. It argues that the JIC's very limited engagement with Northern Ireland prior to 1969 contributed significantly to Whitehall's failure to grasp the drift of affairs from the autumn of 1968 onwards. This was due to the JIC's preoccupation with Cold War issues, compounded by reluctance to interfere in the security affairs of the Northern Ireland government. When Northern Ireland became a stock item of JIC business in 1970, the JIC secretariat became heavily involved in efforts to improve the intelligence system in Northern Ireland. The article also raises the question of the JIC's role in establishing the parameters for intelligence and security operations concerning Northern Ireland, including the controversial `Five Techniques' of interrogation, the introduction of internment in 1971, and covert activities in the Republic of Ireland. The article draws mainly on JIC, Prime Minister's Office and Foreign Office records in the National Archives.     

The Liddell diaries and British intelligence history

This article discusses the wartime diaries of Guy Liddell of MI5. It argues that they are a crucial source for the study of wartime intelligence history, not only in respect of MI5 but also of other British secret agencies, particularly MI6 and SOE. Written in an accessible style, the diaries cast much new light on personalities, events, discussions and decisions both on operational matters and on questions of high policy, including relations with foreign intelligence services, debate on postwar intelligence priority and organization, and ministerial involvement in intelligence and security issues. In their breadth of coverage and information, their treatment of opinions and personalities, their abundance of detail and their fresh and unguarded prose, they are far more interesting, more accurate and more authoritative than either the various in-house MI5 section histories which have been opened to research in recent years, or the Hinsley Simkins volume of the official history of British intelligence. They are as significant a source for intelligence history as are the Cadogan diaries for the study of British foreign policy between 1939 and 1945. The article also points to inconsistencies in redaction throughout the diaries, and to other questions arising from the appearance of this crucial source.     

Intelligence fact and fiction

Nigel West, GCHQ: The Secret Wireless War, 1900–1986 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986), pp.294; £12.95. Phillip Knightley, The Second Oldest Profession: The Spy as Bureaucrat, Patriot, Fantasist and Whore (London: Andre Deutsch, 1986), pp.436; £14.95.