Reforming the Parliamentary Commissioner

For the most part reforms in administrative procedures in England are not produced by rational argument. So the fact that a Committee of Justice has enumerated the deficiencies in the Parliamentary Commissioner legislation gives one no great confidence that the deficiencies will be remedied. Nevertheless the Committee chaired by David Widdicombe QC has performed a useful service by setting out the obvious flaws in the British Ombudsman machinery. * They can be summed up under five headings.     

A Veteran's View of Science Education Today

Science education in our schools is fundamentally the same today as it was fifty years ago and the scientific method has not really changed. Good science teaching is defined as the never‐ending search for evidence, for objective data, which leads to truth, and the search for truth should be at the heart of education in all subjects at all levels, and teacher training should address this objective view point. Science in our schools is watered down with derivatives such as environmental education. Steps should be taken to increase the level of science content knowledge in schools and science teacher education. Additionally, the rules of the open market should be invoked to give science teachers the latitude to offer their services as other providers of professional services do, and receive compensation greater than they would as regular full‐time teachers. These issues are discussed with implications for policy.     

ANTHONY HECHT,PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

This letter is written primarily to inform you that the war is over, and I have come through it unscathed. You had probably guessed as much by this time, but I am sure that my own confirmation can clinch the matter more firmly than anything else. Unscathed, of course, does not mean unaffected. What I have seen and heard here, in conversations with Germans, French, Czechs, and Russians — plus personal observations — combines to make a story well beyond the limits of censorship regulations. You must wait till I can tell you personally of this beautiful country and its demented people.     

THE FULTON COMMITTEE'S MANAGEMENT CONSULTANCY GROUP: AN ASSESSMENT OF ITS CONTRIBUTION

Early access to the papers of the Fulton committee of 1966–8 and to the still unpublished oral evidence that the committee received, which has been Officially granted to the author, enables the contribution of its Management Consultancy Group to be studied fully for the first time, that study being complemented by interviews with the surviving members of the committee, its secretariat, and of the group. The article argues that the group was innovative in that, by means of its report, and through such impact as it had upon the Fulton committee and its report, it put the adoption of the bat private sector management practice into a prominent place on the Fabian socialist agenda for civil service reform and, hence, added an extra dimension to the Fabians' traditional concern about greater efficiency.     

Explaining the Role of Restrictive Rules in the Postreform House

Abstract Four competing explanations have emerged regarding restrictive rules in Congress. Informational theory claims that rules reduce information costs and facilitate committee specialization. The distributional perspective suggests that rules enforce legislative bargains and help members achieve gains‐from‐trade. Another claim is that rules increase the Rules Committee's independent influence over policy. Lastly, partisan theory asserts that rules are used to increase the majority party's influence over policy. Abstract This analysis tests these claims during the 97th, 98th, 104th, and 105th Congresses. The findings demonstrate that theoretical constructs developed in earlier analyses of special rules are not robust over time and across legislative contexts. The results refute majoritarian assertions that rules are used as informational devices. Similarly, little evidence supports the claim that Rules Committee preferences independently affect rule assignment. Instead, a partisan principal‐agent framework emerges as the most useful construct to explain procedural choice in the postreform House.