The fate of the Assyrian minority in early independent Iraq: a test case of political violence based on rational primordialism

Analyzing ethno-national conflicts is usually not easy in that not all quantitative scientific tools are useful to the student of a conflict based on primordial elements. The burden of studying the outcome of a conflict is all the more complex given that the two conflicting groups might be at two different stages of their political development at any given time during the course of the conflict. In the case of the fate of the [Eastern Christian] Assyrian community in early independent Iraq, the political rationale for decisions taken by each party was drawn from different sociological, historical and political realms. Decisions in times of conflict and their political and historical ramifications are not always rational, since they draw upon primordial/communal considerations rather than the accurate reading of the overall true strategic scene.

The violence was an outcome of a combination of primordial differences and rational choice. The Iraqis sought to establish a new sovereign state with minimal disturbances from its Christian minority that they perceived as not belonging to the new nation. As for the Assyrians, they chose violence believing that at least some superpowers would support them. Historically, this rational decision based upon a primordial dispute turned out to be a mistake primarily because of lack of external support, weak internal cohesion of the group, and feeble leadership.     

Problems of the press in Latin America

This article examines whether the inauguration of peace between countries has a significant effect on how the news media cover the other side. It is argued that, due to the nature of news, leaders will generally find it easier to mobilize the media for conflict than for peace. However, the actual role the media will play in such attempts can be understood by looking at the political and media environments in which journalists construct news about peace. A joint project was conducted involving both Israeli and Jordanian researchers. The methodology included in-depth interviews with journalists from both countries and a content analysis of newspaper articles published during three different historical periods. The findings demonstrate that although there was a temporary improvement in the media image of the other side, there was little evidence that peace had a significant and lasting influence on coverage. There were, however, some important changes in the prominence of certain news slots. The interviews with the journalists provided valuable insights about some of the political and professional reasons for these findings.     

The Winner Does Not Take All: Lessons from the Israel-Hamas Conflict

Despite countless studies on victory in armed conflict, scholars disagree about the exact meaning of this term. This article, using primary sources in Hebrew and Arabic, aims to define victory and to discern between types of successful outcomes in war. We analyze three case studies of military collision between Israel and Hamas through a model featuring four levels: tactical, operational, strategic, and systemic. The study shows that in all three clashes (2008, 2012, 2014), the outcomes are difficult to evaluate because the boundaries between the definitions are foggy. It also concludes that neither side has achieved a strategic victory that breaks the status quo that has held since June 2007—though Hamas's leaders have claimed strategic victory due to the group's survival. Israel, without advanced planning, has relied on tactical wins for its strategic policy.     

From Friendship to Patronage: France–Israel Relations, 1958–1967

The article has two main theses: first, that from 1958 to 1967—Charles de Gaulle's presidency—there was a typical patron-client relationship between France and Israel that lasted until the Six Day War. It challenges the frequent claim in the literature that relations between Israel and France did not essentially change after de Gaulle's rise to power. Second, it argues that the basis on which this relationship was founded was rocky from the start since as a client, Israel was not ready to accede to French demands that it restrain its security policy to conform to key French interests.     

News Media and Peace Building in Asymmetrical Conflicts: The Flow of News between Jordan and Israel

This study explores the role of the news media in asymmetrical conflicts after countries have signed a peace agreement. While most research has focused on the inherently negative role the press plays in attempts to bring peace, this study attempts to look at this issue using a more dynamic perspective. The theoretical argument focuses on how political factors affect the quantity and quality of the news flow and some of the ways in which leaders can sometimes overcome the obstacles they face in promoting encouraging news about peace. The model considers two political factors that have a major impact on media performance: the relative level of political power of the two sides and the varying amount of hostility. To illustrate the importance of these factors we focus on the flow of news between Jordan and Israel between 1999 and 2002. The major findings from content analyses of news articles ( N  = 859) appearing in both countries show that while Jordanians are exposed to massive amounts of mostly negative information about Israel, the Israeli public reads almost nothing about Jordan. Despite all this, it was also found that the initiation of diplomatic relations between the former enemies allowed for the creation of important 'news slots' that were previously unavailable. This development created space for less threatening types of news and also allowed leaders from both Jordan and Israel to initiate some positive stories about peace, even during some of the darkest periods.     

Revenge in International Politics

This paper conceptualizes the phenomenon of revenge in international politics and seeks to specify the conditions that increase or diminish the tendency of states to take revenge against enemies. We situate the discussion of revenge within the broader context of emotions in IR. We argue that whether or not a state will take revenge depends on the combinations of three interrelated and mutually constitutive variables: (1) the degree to which a state emotionally experiences harm against it as morally outrageous, (2) the extent of humiliation the harmed state feels, and (3) the degree to which international retaliation is institutionalized by rules and laws that govern the use of cross-border force. We examine the Second Lebanon War (July 2006) as a case of revenge in international politics.     

Journalism,publicity and the lost art of argument

“Journalism, publicity and the lost art of argument” by Christopher Lasch. Gannett Center Journal, (Spring 1990) 1–11.     

GULF STATES' POLICY TOWARDS SYRIAN REFUGEES: CHARITY BEFORE HOSPITALITY

The regional turmoil in the Middle East since December 2010 has provided researchers with many topics for research. Despite a relatively large number of studies in recent years, none of them deal with one of the central questions – namely, the attitude of the Gulf States toward the misery of the Syrian refugees. While more than six million Syrians fled their homeland and became refugees, 1.5 million in Europe, few, if any, succeeded in relocating to the Gulf States.

This paper endeavors to explore the Gulf States' policy toward Arab (mostly Syrian) refugees. The major finding is that GCC members prefer to grant financial support to refugees outside of the Gulf region (this is justified as charity – Zakat) instead of hosting refugees. The combination of a fragile demographic structure, fear of political and social instability, and constant concern about infiltration by terrorists under the guise of refugees are the main reasons for the policy of closing the gates entirely to the refugees. These concerns also indicate that the idea of the nation state prevails over pan-Arab nationalism.     

Trust Parties’ Uniquely Easy Access to Rescission: Analysis,Critique and Reform

Parties to trusts currently enjoy easier access to judicial avoidance of voluntary dispositions resulting from mistakes and inadequate decision‐making than other persons. The principal doctrinal basis for this advantage has shifted from the rule in Re Hastings‐Bass to rescission in equity. The article argues that this advantage is normatively unjustified, and recommends a uniform legal framework to govern the avoidance of voluntary dispositions resulting from mistakes or inadequate decision‐making, whether or not a trust was involved. Under this framework, dispositions resulting from laypersons’ mistakes and inadequate decision‐making should be avoided, subject to appropriate defences, whenever that causative nexus is present, while dispositions resulting from professionals’ mistakes and inadequate decision‐making should only be avoided where the mistake or deliberative flaw was so serious as to render the transferee's retention of property transferred unjust.