PREDICTING STATE ABORTION LEGISLATION FROM U.S. SENATE VOTES: THE EFFECTS OF APPARENT IDEOLOGICAL SHIRKING

The recent Supreme Court decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services giving more discretion to states to regulate abortion has led to speculation concerning which states might move to limit abortions. Medoff (1989) attempts to predict how state legislatures might vote on state-level abortion legislation by examining the 1983 Senate vote on the Hatch/Eagleton Amendment. We expand upon Medoff's analysis by incor- porating recent developments in agency theory as it applies to the political agents (i.e., Senators) in the empirical model. The results demonstrate that accounting for Senatorial "shirking" and state ideology substantially im- proves the predictive ability of the model for the Senate abortion vote. The predicted votes of the state's Senators, after eliminating the effects of apparent Senatorial shirking, are used to infer the likelihood of state-level legislation substantially restricting abortion. We compare these results to a base model that ignores the issue of shirking and find increased predict- ability and several differing results.     

Which States Will Restrict Abortions? Predictions from Votes in the House of Representatives

In response to the Supreme Court's rulings in Webster v. Reproductive Services and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, which increased the ability of states to restrict abortions, many state legislatures have reexamined their abortion policies. Several recent studies use a variety of methods to predict whether states will restrict abortion access. These studies have utilized congressional votes on abortion legislation, past state laws restricting abortions, or current attitudes by state legislators and governors. Each method has its merits and limitations. This paper uses recent votes in the states' House of Representatives pertaining to abortion issues to predict the likelihood of significant abortion restrictions. These results are compared with rankings from other recent studies.     

The economics of AIDS-related health insurance regulations: Interest group influence and ideology

The projected growth in the U.S. in the number of persons with AIDS has created concern about sources of financing the costs of health care services for persons with AIDS. Private health insurers have modified or considered modifying underwriting practices in response to the AIDS epidemic, but several state governments have developed significant regulatory constraints on AIDS-related underwriting practices. We model the state government's decision to impose AIDS-related regulatory constraints (HIV testing restrictions, restrictions on the use of information about sexual orientation, and mandated AIDS coverage). We find that HIV-testing restrictions tend to be more likely in states with relatively high AIDS prevalence rates and insurance industries that are relatively weak politically. States with prevailing attitudes favorable to persons with AIDS (i.e., relatively liberal states) are more likely than other states to impose HIV-testing restrictions. Measures of prevailing attitudes (ideology) appear to be the primary determinants of regulations prohibiting questions about sexual orientation, but economic interests are the primary determinants of mandated AIDS coverage.The authors would like to acknowledge the helpful comments and suggestions of Ned Becker, Janet Bronstein, David Colby, Patrick Donnelly, Roger Faith, Robert Hughes, Robert McGuire, Delfi Mondragón, Mike Morrisey, Jack Nelson and an anonymous reviewer, with the usual disclaimer.