Professional roles for policy analysts: A critical assessment

Analysts who act as employees or advisors in agencies that make public policy may find themselves operating in any of several different roles. They may see themselves as objective technicians, above the political fray, or as advocates of causes of their own choosing, or as unquestioning proponents of the positions adopted by their employers. Their choice of roles will differ, according to some systematic characteristics found in the environment. Any serious effort to develop a code for the behavior of policy analysts must take these differences into account.     

The Advent of Internet Surveys for Political Research: A Comparison of Telephone and Internet Samples

The Internet offers a number of advantages as a survey mode:low marginal cost per completed response, capabilities for providingrespondents with large quantities of information, speed, andelimination of interviewer bias. Those seeking these advantagesconfront the problem of representativeness both in terms ofcoverage of the population and capabilities for drawing randomsamples. Two major strategies have been pursued commerciallyto develop the Internet as a survey mode. One strategy, usedby Harris Interactive, involves assembling a large panel ofwilling respondents who can be sampled. Another strategy, usedby Knowledge Networks, involves using random digit dialing (RDD)telephone methods to recruit households to a panel of Web-TVenabled respondents. Do these panels adequately deal with theproblem of representativeness to be useful in political scienceresearch? The authors address this question with results fromparallel surveys on global climate change and the Kyoto Protocoladministered by telephone to a national probability sample andby Internet to samples of the Harris Interactive and KnowledgeNetworks panels. Knowledge and opinion questions generally showstatistically significant but substantively modest differenceacross the modes. With inclusion of standard demographic controls,typical relational models of interest to political scientistsproduce similar estimates of parameters across modes. It thusappears that, with appropriate weighting, samples from thesepanels are sufficiently representative of the U.S. populationto be reasonable alternatives in many applications to samplesgathered through RDD telephone surveys.     

Exploring Aggregate vs. Relative Public Trust in Administrative Agencies that Manage Spent Nuclear Fuel in the United States

Trust is a key component of democratic decision‐making and becomes even more salient in highly technical policy areas, where the public relies heavily on experts for decision making and on the information provided by federal agencies. Research to date has not examined whether the members of the public place different levels of trust in the various agencies that operate within the same policy subsystem, especially in a highly technical subsystem such as that of nuclear energy and waste management. This paper explores public trust in multiple agencies operating within the same subsystem, trust in each agency relative to aggregate trust across agencies that operate within the nuclear waste subsystem, and trust in alternative agencies that have been suggested as possible players in the decision‐making process. We find that trust accorded to different federal agencies within the nuclear waste subsystem varies. The variation in trust is systematically associated with multiple factors, including basic trust in government, perceptions about the risks and benefits of nuclear energy/waste management, party identification, and education. These findings have significant implications for research on public trust in specific government agencies, alternative policy entities, and for policy makers who want to design robust and successful policies and programs in highly technical policy domains.     

“PRISONERS” OF PRIVATE INDUSTRY: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND STATE SUNSHINE LAWS

There is an ongoing push by governments to keep secret their negotiations with private businesses, resulting in a state-eat-state battle for jobs, with the governments often offering potential businesses millions of dollars in tax breaks and other incentives. A tire factory could pop up next door and community members may not know about it until after the deal is signed. Some states exempt such negotiations in their sunshine laws. Some include such exemptions in the codes that govern economic development agencies themselves rather than in the sunshine law. Responses by courts to such secrecy has been mixed. This article reviews fifty state codes to determine whether officials are free to negotiate behind closed doors, and examines relevant case law. It also offers recommendations for policy changes to ensure transparency in such negotiations.