Can the Boundary Commissions Help the Conservative Party? Constituency Size and Electoral Bias in the United Kingdom

As part of a strategy to remove perceived biases operating against it in the system used for elections to the House of Commons, the British Conservative party is promoting a revision of the rules used by the Boundary Commissions to ensure greater equality in constituency electorates. A Bill designed to achieve this—and also to reduce the size of the House—was introduced to the House of Lords in 2007. This paper critiques that Bill and suggests an alternative formulation that would better achieve the goal, whilst identifying a number of operational difficulties that its implementation would involve.     

Choosing between Impossible Alternatives: Creating a New Constituency Map for Wales, 2004

The allocation of at least 35 parliamentary constituencies to Wales in the 1944 House of Commons (Redistribution of Seats) Act meant that Wales was over-represented in the House of Commons. Subsequent decisions by the Boundary Commission for Wales, operating within a set of mutually contradictory rules, increased the number of Welsh seats to 40 and exacerbated the country's over-representation in the House, relative to the situation for England.
In its Fifth Periodic Review, the Boundary Commission has determined not to recommend any further growth in the number of Welsh constituencies, but its method of doing this has created substantial inequalities within the country, with the area around Cardiff significantly under-represented relative to the situation in North Wales. These inequalities will also apply to the Welsh Assembly. The political parties did not challenge these recommendations, presumably because they felt that their interests were best served by the inequalities. Analysis shows that alternative sets of recommendations would have been somewhat more egalitarian, but within an overall structure of unfairness guaranteed by the unworkable rules under which the Commissions must operate.     

Climate Change and UK Politics: From Brynle Williams to Sir Nicholas Stern

In 2000 the UK Labour government abandoned annual real fuel duty increases - a policy it had inherited from the preceding Conservative administration - in the face of direct action by farmers and hauliers. A short-term Conservative lead in the polls opened up. In 2006, the same Chancellor, Gordon Brown, announced an increase in air passenger duty from February 2007 in the light of the newly published Stern Review. The opposition parties denounced this as too feeble.
As Stern points out, all citizens in the world are in a global N-person prisoners' dilemma. Everybody knows that a world without global warming is better than a world with it; but each actor is unconditionally better off from continuing to pollute than from restraining her polluting.
Everybody expects somebody else to drive less. Now, however, all parties have committed themselves to tax and/or emission trading policies to mitigate global warming. The paper examines this transition.     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: INTERESTS, IDEOLOGY, VOTERS, AND THE UK REGULATION OF RAILWAYS ACT 1844

Government regulation of the railways in the United Kingdom dates back to the 1840s. Between 1840 and 1844 three regulatory Acts were passed, and a system of government inspection set up which has remained substantially unaltered to the present day. The principal Act, that of 1844, contained controversial powers of rate-capping, state purchase of railways, and detailed price and quantity regulation. It is still frequently held that the Victorian era marked the triumph of laissez-faire and that W. E. Gladstone, the promoter of the 1844 Act, was one of its leading spokesmen. The article therefore explores why regulation occurred at all and why it took the forms it did. Gladstone's actions are evaluated in relation to the standard hypotheses about the origins of regulation. Hypotheses on the motives of MPS voting for and against regulation are tested using the Aydelotte dataset which contains very full personal and ideological data on the Mps of the Parliament of 1841–7.     

Three roads to institutionalisation: Vote‐, office‐ and policy‐seeking explanations of party switching in Poland

Party institutionalisation is a central problem in political science. The literature tends to understand it as a syndrome and therefore has difficulty explaining variations. This article suggests a new approach based on the transaction between a legislative party and its deputies, the failure of which is observable in party switching. Three routes to institutionalisation are identified by appealing to the vote‐seeking, office‐seeking or policy‐seeking motivations of deputies. Poland has had a large volume of party switching, along with wide variation in the incentives facing differently‐motivated deputies. Survival analyses of switching in four Polish parliaments find that vote‐seeking is the most likely route to institutionalisation for Polish parties. Moreover, in this article a concrete hypothesis is established for comparative testing: legislative parties can survive as long as their popular support exceeds 40 per cent of their share in the previous election.     

Report of the Commission on the Consequences of Devolution for the House of Commons (the McKay Commission)

The report of the McKay Commission on the Consequences of Devolution for the House of Commons is reviewed. The Commission, which contained experts on parliamentary procedure, raised a number of important and difficult questions; the answers are less impressive than the questions. In view of the difficulties of any scheme, including that proposed by the Commission, for what is popularly known as “English Votes on English Laws,” policymakers should revisit one of the options that was specifically ruled out of McKay's terms of reference. This would be a reduction in the numbers, but not the powers, of MPs from Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland in the way that applied to Northern Ireland between 1922 and 1979.