Spending Preferences of Public Sector Officials: Survey Evidence from Finland

We examine the determinants that shape the spending preferences of public sector officials on several budgetary appropriations. Following Niskanen's budget‐maximizing theory, we test whether these officials prefer larger budgetary appropriations rather than less. We measure their preferences to increase their own bureau's appropriations and compare those against their preferences for other bureaus' appropriations. The empirical evidence is gathered via a mail survey targeting high‐level officials from different ministries in Finland. The analysis of the responses suggests that Niskanen's theory is in part supported.     

Bureaucratic tradition, semi-presidential rule and parliamentary government: the case of Finland

Abstract. Primarily on account of the 'semi-presidential' trait of the regime Finland is, along with France, often regarded as a deviant case among Western European states. The presidency certainly restrains the leadership role of the prime minister and curtails the governmental agenda on foreign policy. But in its everyday political process Finland still reveals customary features of European multiparty parliamentarism. With special emphasis on the bureaucratic tradition of the central administration, the article examines the structure of the State Council and outlines four styles of decision-making.