The Epistemological Foundations of Public Choice Theory

The new political economy - public choice - has contributed considerably to a long-awaited inter-marriage between political science and economics. The economic approach to the interpretation of the public sector - politics as well as administration - has resulted in a number of interestingly relevant models. At the same time modelling political behaviour on the basis of the economic man perspective gives rise to puzzling difficulties creating much controversy. The article attempts to establish in principle the ethically neutral and scientifically objective nature of the public choice approach. It elaborates on the crucial concept of self-interest in the public choice behaviour assumptions in order to show that the criticism from the public interest adherents may be countered.     

Parties and Voters: What Creates the Ties?

The increasing instability in the electorate and the party system forces us to reconsider the Lipset-Rokkan thesis about the frozen party system. In this approach, cleavages played a major role, but in Western Europe, this role has diminished significantly. The frequent shifts in voter allegiance call for a new understanding of the mechanisms that connect voters and parties. A reinterpretation of the concepts of a "frozen party system" or "cleavages" is not enough. We need a new theory about the strategic interaction between parties and a floating electorate.     

Determinanten politischer Kultur am Beispiel des Schwyzer Stimmverhaltens

The new institutionalist approach is heavily committed to the idea that institutions matter. This article explores this commitment by examining the institutions of corporatism using comparative data in order to relate these to those of Konkordanzdemokratie. A neo-institutionalist perspective may be employed to illustrate how the institutions of Konkordanzdemokratie and macrocorporatism are related, both in terms of their origins as well as their policy outputs and outcomes. This article shows that both the conditions and the configuration of outputs and outcomes of Konkordanzdemokratie and corporatism are different. Therefore, one should clearly distinguish between these two sets of institutions. In a cross-sectional approach the configuration of socio-economic outcomes connected with these institutions are not as impressive as often claimed.     

Public Finance Variations: A New Approach*

Few themes have aroused so much interest and contention as the search for environmental determinants of public policy. One major problem area in this debate concerns the identification of explanatory variables accounting for the cross-country variation in public expenditures. As no agreement has been reached about the basic issues involved, it seems appropriate to formulate a new approach to the problem of accounting for public finance patterns. An argument is presented to the effect that the employment of more rigorous econometric tools may help us draw an outline of the structural pattern behind the public household. The analysis indicates that we must abandon the idea of identifying stable structures that describe the relationships between the public household and the environment.     

Project Abstract: an Anglo-American intelligence operation in 1947 to recover guided weapon technical documentation buried in Germany

In early 1947, American intelligence organisations learned that there were hidden collections of technical documentation that pertained to World War II German guided weapon development that were not recovered by Allied investigators in 1945. A joint Anglo-American intelligence operation was initiated in February of that year, dubbed ‘Project Abstract’ by the Americans, to recover the caches. Project Abstract was a concerted effort by British and American scientific and technical intelligence experts to round up the last material remains of the World War II guided weapon programmes at the renowned experimental and testing establishments at Peenemünde in northern Germany.     

Constitutional analysis: The power index approach

Abstract. A power index approach to the EU institutions gives a new perspective upon the EU institutions and their future reform. Using a standard power measure, the Banzhaf index, we show that in a group of states as the EU council, the voting power of a member state is equal to twice the individual power to block multiplied by the group's collective power to change. Political power of the member states is calculated under alternative constitutional rules for the EU, where cooperative game theory allows the derivation of power equivalences. We suggest that simple majority should be used more often in the EU council.     

From-Long Term To Short-Term Contracting

One can look at the arrival of New Public Management and the extensive public sector reforms inspired by this theory from many angles. Here we examine the shift from long-term contracting, typical of bureaucracy and traditional enterprises, to short-term contracting, borrowed from private sector governance methods. Short-term contracting has three principal uses in the governance of the public sector: (a) contracting with service providers after a tendering/bidding process; (b) contracting with the CEOs of the incorporated public enterprises; and (c) contracting with executive agencies about what they should deliver. Theoretical analysis, supported by substantial empirical evidence, suggests that short-term contracting eliminates the extensive post-contractual opportunism connected with long-term contracting, but is vulnerable to precontractual opportunism. Short-term contracting is not just another public sector reform fad, but constitutes a new tool for government which increases efficiency when handled with prudence.     

Democracy in microstates: why smallness does not produce a democratic political system

To fully understand the function of volatility in today's European democracies, it is necessary to employ the principal-agent model. Where democracy is exercised in the form of party government, then it is especially essential to enquire into how the electorate can monitor politicians. Electoral volatility may increase the responsiveness of the party system to the electorate and increase the accountability of politicians. Party system instability is persistently higher in the east European democracies than in western Europe. System transition in eastern Europe passes through the party system, as new parties enter the electoral arena. Political innovation in western Europe also passes through the party system, where new movements appear alongside the established parties. However, there are signs of decreasing volatility in the east, whereas volatility is on the rise in several west European democracies. There will be convergence between west and east European democracies: both will experience considerable volatility in the future. This is a positive gain for democratic vitality in Tingsten's conception. The level of party system fractionalization is already the same over the regions of Europe. The principal-agent model would favour several agents as well as agent switches, which means a moderate level of party system instability.