State Lotteries for Public Revenue

Lotteries, the state fiscal gimmick of the eighties, operate in jurisdictions encompassing substantially more than half the nation's population and enjoy considerable public acceptance. The revenue they generate is small, rarely more than two percent of state general revenue, it is subject to major year-to-year swings, and it is very expensive to generate, particularly when vendor commissions are recognized as part of cost. Furthermore, lotteries bear a high implicit excise tax rate and, because of the pattern of play across income classes, appears to worsen the overall equity of the revenue system. Their economic impact appears to be that of an internal transfer, although states with major lottery equipment suppliers have most to gain, particularly if they do not operate their own lottery. Lotteries are not destined to become mainstays of government finance, although their spread is likely, even with the fiscal questions they raise.     

Modeling Duration Dependence

As applications of duration analysis have burgeoned in politicalscience, scholars have become increasingly aware of the potentialsubstantive importance of duration dependence: the extent towhich the conditional hazards of the events of interest arerising or falling over time. Here I discuss the issue of durationdependence, focusing on the distinction between "spurious" dependencedue to unobserved heterogeneity and "true" duration dependencedue to state dependence in the process of interest. I presenta simple extension of a commonly used parametric duration model—theWeibull model—which allows researchers to assess the influenceof causal variables on the nature and extent of duration dependencein their data. I then illustrate the application of this "generalizedWeibull" model using data on the duration of international alliances.     

Comment on “Does the Likely Demographics of Affordable Housing Justify NIMBYism?”

Abstract

Automated underwriting (AU) systems have become the tool of choice in mortgage lending decisions. While these systems provide significant benefits to mortgage originators and investors, questions have been raised about their impact on underserved populations. The questions focus on the relative accuracy of AU compared with manual underwriting and whether AU has increased the flow of mortgage credit to underserved consumers.

Using information from Freddie Mac's Loan Prospector AU service, we provide statistics useful in examining these issues. The data strongly support our view that AU provides substantial benefits to consumers, particularly those at the margin of the underwriting decision. We find evidence that AU systems more accurately predict default than manual underwriters do. We also find evidence that this increased accuracy results in higher borrower approval rates, especially for underserved applicants.     

Comment on Donald R. Haurin and Hazel A. Morrow‐Jones's “the impact of Real Estate Market knowledge on tenure choice: A comparison of black and white households”

Abstract

Haurin and Morrow‐Jones analyze a sample of survey respondents from Columbus, OH, and find that additional knowledge about real estate markets increases the likelihood of homeownership. They conclude that differences in real estate knowledge contribute importantly to explaining some of the racial gap in homeownership rates; this finding leads to their conclusion that the racial gap can be addressed through public policy interventions, including financial counseling programs.

Their research broadly addresses three questions: Why does the racial gap in homeownership exist? Why does it persist? What can be done to reduce it? We compare their findings with those of other researchers and conclude that improved financial literacy may well be an important tool for reducing the gap, but that the causes for its existence and persistence are complex and that improving financial literacy alone may not be sufficient to have a significant and lasting impact.     

The economic perspective on public administration

Public administration as a body of thought and field of study is changing from a paradigm dominated by political science to an eclectic array of theoretical contributions from all of the social sciences, particularly economics. Basic education and training in economics is essential to an effective contemporary public administration. Without a fundamental understanding of economics the “do-it-yourself-economics” which is practiced in policy-making contributes to basic errors in policy.

As the size and significance of the public sector has grown, increased attention has been paid to the discipline of public administration. What began as a structured way of describing the operation and structure of public management and public organizations has evolved into a discipline that has a much broader scope—the analysis of policy making in the public and not-for-profit sectors. In addition, employment in the public administration profession is more likely to be viewed as a vocation rather than as an avocation, in contrast to the past.

Once the repository of generalists in the areas of public management and organizational behavior, public administration has become a hodgepodge of individuals with varied backgrounds and training. This has resulted in a discipline that has notable strengths and weaknesses. A major weakness, and source of criticism from outsiders, is the discipline's lack of a paradigm—there is no easily identifiable intellectual structure. Its strength lies in the diverse theoretical, conceptual, and methodological contributions borrowed from other disciplines.

The most prominent contributor has been political science, where the discipline of public administration had its origins. Political science's influence on public administration still is evident: numerous public administration programs are located in political science departments; a large number of faculty in public administration programs are political scientists by training; and public administration professional societies and publications are dominated by political scientists.

Economics has made forays into public administration and established garrisons in some of the larger and more prominent programs. But, economics has failed to have a distinct impact on everyday public policy making. This is evident in many policy decisions that lack much semblance of basic economic understanding on the part of decision makers. Recent examples include the handling of the federal deficit, solutions to airway and airport congestion, the war on poverty, housing programs, dealings with international trading partners, proposed solutions to the third world debt crisis, resolution of the acid rain problem, and so forth.

Although other explanations can be offered for the absence of good economic reasoning in many policy decisions, a lot of the blame lies with public administration's failure to adequately integrate economics. Economics does not wield substantial influence in either the discipline's curricular matter or administrative structure. This failure partially can be attributed to a lack of understanding of what economics has to offer the discipline and partially can be attributed to the insolent demeanor of many economists.

This paper proposes to discuss what role economics can and should play in public administration. First, the relationship between public administration and economics is discussed. Second, deficiencies within the economics discipline that keep it from becoming an integral component of everyday policy making are discussed. Finally, ways to better blend economics into public policy making are proposed.     

Defending coase against false charges: A comment on block

This note suggests that Coase's The Problem of Social Cost has been read and interpreted too broadly to apply to all aspects of law. Drawing from Coase's own work, I show that Coase was narrowly focused on the economic analysis of negative externalities. This understanding of the paper precludes it from being used as a justification for the broad redistribution of property rights for the purpose of wealth maximization. This understanding of Coase's paper also defends his work against charges from those who object to making the determination of property rights secondary to the maximization of wealth.     

A Competing Risks Model of Supreme Court Vacancies, 1789–1992

We hypothesize that Supreme Court justices will consider the likely ideological disposition of their successor in their decision to retire or remain on the Court. Furthermore, because a justice's decision to remain on the Court places him or her at risk of dying in office, it is necessary to consider a model of both voluntary and involuntary vacancies. Our study examines three broad classes of factors influential to Supreme Court vacancies: personal considerations, institutional context, and political influences. We assess the factors that affect the probability of a vacancy on the U.S. Supreme Court due to mortality and retirement at the individual level from 1789 to 1992, using a competing risk duration model and incorporating time-varying covariates. We find significant differences in the hazards of vacancy due to these two causes, and a number of factors are shown to influence the probability of a vacancy, including a general propensity to retire near the beginning of presidents' second terms. However, we find little evidence of the influence of political factors in either retirement-or death-related vacancies, suggesting that justices who retire do not generally do so for expressly political reasons and those who die in office rarely do so as a result of holding out for a like-minded replacement.     

The Airport and Airway Trust Fund: A Continuing Controversy

Despite calls for increased outlays from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund to help finance improvements in the nation's air transportation system, the fund's surplus continued to grow during the Reagan years. It becomes readily apparent, when the issues surrounding the trust fund and its surplus are analyzed, that placing the blame solely on deficit considerations is too simplistic. Instead, partisan politics, the congressional budget process, delays in technology development, and budget pressures are responsible for the growing surplus.