Representational Altruism: The Wary Cooperator as Authoritative Decision Maker

What drives policymakers to put the interests of others above their own? If human nature is inherently selfish, it makes sense to institutionalize incentives that counter decision makers' temptations to use their positions to benefit themselves over others. A growing literature rooted in evolutionary theories of human behavior, however, suggests that humans, under certain circumstances, have inherent predispositions towards “representational altruism,” i.e., to make an authoritative decision to benefit another at one's own expense. Drawing on Hibbing and Alford's conception of the wary cooperator, a theoretical case is made for such behavioral expectations, which are confirmed in a series of original laboratory experiments.     

Does Federalism Weaken Democratic Representation in the United States?

The framers of the U.S. Constitution explicitly designed federalismto enhance representation. Because powers are divided amongmultiple governments, citizens are able to exert pressure onthe elected officials of various governments in an effort toachieve desired outcomes. If one government is not doing whatcitizens prefer, they can seek it from a different government.This assumes that individuals form opinions about the functionsperformed by different governments. Given the complexity offederalism, this may be an unrealistic assumption for many citizens.Original survey data uniquely suited to explore this questionsuggest that citizens do behave in a fashion consistent withthe federalist framework. Moreover, the actual change in theassignment of functional responsibilities across governmentsbehaves as if it responds to public opinion.     

The Relational Principle of Trust and Confidence

This article seeks to explain why, in terms of Iain Macneil'srelational theory of contract, the implied mutual duty of trustand confidence can be described as a quintessentially relationalnorm. The role played by the duty in the development of a relationalapproach to variation of the employment contract is examined.The potential for the trust duty to become a relational principleinforming the content of the employment contract is explored.The impact of litigation based on the trust duty in creatinga relational approach to employees’ contractual remediesat common law, which have traditionally been dominated by thenotice rule, is assessed. Finally, the potential for there todevelop a relational principle of trust and confidence capableof, to some extent, unifying the contractual, statutory andtortious elements of the law of the employment relationshipis examined.