A minimax procedure for electing committees

A new voting procedure for electing committees, called the minimax procedure, is described. Based on approval balloting, it chooses the committee that minimizes the maximum Hamming distance to voters’ ballots, where these ballots are weighted by their proximity to other voters’ ballots. This minimax outcome may be diametrically opposed to the outcome obtained by aggregating approval votes in the usual manner, which minimizes the sum of the Hamming distances and is called the minisum outcome. The manipulability of these procedures, and their applicability when election outcomes are restricted in various ways, are also investigated. The minimax procedure is applied to the 2003 Game Theory Society election of a council of 12 new members from a list of 24 candidates. By rendering outlying voters less influential and not antagonizing any voters too much, it arguably would have produced a committee more representative of the interests of all voters than the minisum committee that was elected.     

Multiwinner approval voting: an apportionment approach

Public Choice - To ameliorate ideological or partisan cleavages in councils and legislatures, we propose modifications of approval voting in order to elect multiple winners, who may be either...     

Forming stable coalitions: The process matters

Players are assumed to rank each other as coalition partners. Two processes of coalition formation are defined and illustrated:

• Fallback (FB): Players seek coalition partners by descending lower and lower in their preference rankings until some majority coalition, all of whose members consider each other mutually acceptable, forms.
• Build-up (BU): Same descent as FB, except only majorities whose members rank each other highest form coalitions.

BU coalitions are stable in the sense that no member would prefer to be in another coalition, whereas FB coalitions, whose members need not rank each other highest, may not be stable. BU coalitions are bimodally distributed in a random society, with peaks around simple majority and unanimity; the distributions of majorities in the US Supreme Court and in the US House of Representatives follow this pattern. The dynamics of real-life coalition-formation processes are illustrated by two Supreme Court cases.

     

Treating high-risk rapists in a New Zealand intensive prison programme

The focus of this article is on the pilot development and implementation of a prison-based intensive treatment programme for high-risk adult-victim rape offenders in New Zealand. Advances in actuarial risk assessment enabled the identification of a group of high-risk adult sex offenders for whom no dedicated treatment programme existed. Based on a review of the treatment literature for rapists, a pilot programme was developed called the Adult Sex Offender Treatment Programme (ASOTP). The programme, based on the risk–need–responsivity and cognitive behavioural therapy principles, also used an adaptation of Young's schema therapy to address personality responsivity issues and specific idiosyncratic schema associated with participant offence pathways identified by the Massachusetts Treatment Centre classification (Version 3 for rapists). Measures of responsivity and dynamic risk administered in the ASOTP indicated some success in addressing treatment needs for the pilot participants (n=10). The programme has subsequently been expanded across prison specialist treatment unit sites and delivered to a further 52 participants. Although intermediate measures continue to indicate change in dynamic risk, recidivism outcome evaluations have not yet been possible, due to low numbers of paroled participants.     

Alignment Patterns, Crisis Bargaining, and Extended Deterrence: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

To explore the impact of alignment patterns in a rudimentary state system, we develop and analyze the Tripartite Crisis Game, a three-person game among Challenger, Defender, and Protégé. This model captures some of the tensions implicit in the "Alliance" and "Adversary" games, two related but theoretically isolated models due to Snyder. Our analysis enables us to delineate and explore the circumstances that give rise to the "deterrence versus restraint" dilemma. It also provides an answer to Fearon's empirical puzzle: when convincing commitments are possible, why are halfhearted signals sometimes sent?
Our most surprising result concerns the impact of Protégé's threat on Challenger's optimal behavior. When Challenger is willing to fight to back up its demand, but is nonetheless only weakly or moderately motivated, Protégé's threat to realign—though directed at Defender— can dissuade Challenger from initiating a crisis. But when Challenger is willing to fight and stands to gain a great deal, Protégé's threat may actually prompt Challenger to make a demand. Our analysis uncovers this unexpected pattern of behavior and suggests when it occurs. That Protégé's threat to realign sometimes bolsters deterrence, and sometimes undermines it, has implications for the selection bias issue in studies of alliance reliability and helps to explain why some alliances are stabilizing while others are associated with crises and war. The nonlinear consequences of Protégé's commitment seem to us to constitute another "paradox of war."     

The Canadian constitutional amending formula: Bargaining in the past and the future

Public Choice - The amending formula of Canada's Constitution Act, 1982 is analysed and assessed, as are a variety of alternative formulae, some of which were actually proposed and then...     

New Zealand's special treatment units: the development and implementation of intensive treatment for high-risk male prisoners

In the late 1980s, New Zealand developed two highly innovative residential treatment programmes for serious offenders that blended together the strengths of structured cognitive behavioural group programmes and therapeutic community approaches. Since the mid-1990s this hybrid model – recently advocated as a fruitful direction for future offender programme development – was adopted and further refined for use in New Zealand's four high-risk special treatment units (HRSTUs). We outline the HRSTU model, noting the challenges and potential benefits of providing an intervention that integrates therapy, resocialisation and reintegration experiences for high-risk, high need, low responsivity clients: many with significant psychopathic features. On average, the majority of those referred to HRSTUs complete the programme and make small but significant amounts of change on important treatment goals. But most changes remain tentative, suggesting the importance of more supportive aftercare. Although an earlier evaluation of the first unit to open found the programme to be modestly effective in reducing recidivism, an outcome evaluation currently underway will help establish whether improvements since that time are associated with reductions in disciplinary infractions and recidivism.