Front‐Door Difference‐in‐Differences Estimators

We develop front‐door difference‐in‐differences estimators as an extension of front‐door estimators. Under one‐sided noncompliance, an exclusion restriction, and assumptions analogous to parallel trends assumptions, this extension allows identification when the front‐door criterion does not hold. Even if the assumptions are relaxed, we show that the front‐door and front‐door difference‐in‐differences estimators may be combined to form bounds. Finally, we show that under one‐sided noncompliance, these techniques do not require the use of control units. We illustrate these points with an application to a job training study and with an application to Florida's early in‐person voting program. For the job training study, we show that these techniques can recover an experimental benchmark. For the Florida program, we find some evidence that early in‐person voting had small positive effects on turnout in 2008. This provides a counterpoint to recent claims that early voting had a negative effect on turnout in 2008.     

A game-theoretic model for protest in the context of post-communism

In recent years, large-scale protests have forced several incumbent governments in former Soviet countries from power. Scholarly examinations of these events have lacked a cohesive explanation of the reasons for the success of certain movements and the failure of others. This study uses prior research on the dynamics of protest to formulate a game-theoretic model for why protest takes place and how its eventual outcome comes about. The model is tested through logistic regression analyses of monthly protest data. The statistical analysis shows that elections, prior protests and government transgressions increase the likelihood of anti-government protests.     

Businessman Candidates

Why and when do businessmen run for public office rather than rely upon other means of influence? What are the implications of their participation for public policy? We show formally that “businessman candidacy” and public policy are jointly determined by the institutional environment. When institutions that hold elected officials accountable to voters are strong, businessmen receive little preferential treatment and are disinclined to run for office. When such institutions are weak, businessmen can subvert policy irrespective of whether they hold office, but they may run for office to avoid the cost of lobbying elected officials. Evidence from Russian gubernatorial elections supports the model's predictions. Businessman candidates emerge in regions with low media freedom and government transparency, institutions that raise the cost of reneging on campaign promises. Among regions with weaker institutions, professional politicians crowd out businessmen when the rents from office are especially large.     

Threats to Leaders’ Political Survival and Pro-Government Militia Formation

It is puzzling why leaders delegate authority to pro-government militias (PGMs) at the expense of professional armed forces. Several state-level explanations, ranging from low state capacity to blame evasion for human rights violations have been proposed for the establishment of PGM linkages. These explanations lack focus on the individuals making decisions to form PGMs: national leaders. It is argued that leaders create linkages with PGMs to facilitate leaders’ political survival in the event of their deposition. Threats to leaders’ survival come from the military, foreign powers, or domestic actors outside the ruling coalition. As costs of leader deposition are low for the state, leaders facing threats from one or all of these sources must invest in protection from outside of the security apparatus. The argument is tested through data on PGM linkage formation and threats to political survival. Results show that leaders under coup threat are more likely to form PGM linkages, while threats from foreign actors make leaders particularly more likely to form linkages with ethnic or religious PGMs. The findings strongly suggest that PGM linkage formation is driven by leader-level desire for political survival, rather than a host of state-level explanations.     

Representative Democracy and Fighting Domestic Terrorism

Does more representative government improve states' ability to fight domestic terrorism? In prior work, democracies are seen as more susceptible to terrorism because their respect for human rights prevents them from fully eliminating terrorist groups. However, such extrajudicial aggression could also alienate large portions of the population and create the ideal conditions for an insurgency. I argue that since terrorism is the lowest-capacity form of political violence, it is natural that states that do best at deterring political violence experience the most terrorism. While representative democracies should see terrorist groups initiate spells of attacks at a greater frequency, full political representation should also galvanize major political actors to unite and eliminate terrorist threats. I test this assertion through statistical models that treat the process of terrorist group initiation and its duration and intensity separately. Results not only show that less consolidated democracies and autocracies experience longer and more intense terrorist campaigns, but that, in support of the theory's mechanisms, groups are more likely to shift to terrorism from insurgency when their political base gains more political representation. The results call the division among research programs of various political violence types into question.