The Effect of HAVA on Late-to-Innovate States: External Influence on Election Reform in Arizona and Illinois

As election reform diffused across the American states, therewas considerable variation in the states' willingness to innovate,their timing in doing so, and the influence of the federal HelpAmerica Vote Act (HAVA). Through the lens of the policy-diffusionliterature, this article examines the reform processes in Arizonaand Illinois, two representatives of the handful of states thatwere late in innovating, in order to test for effects of HAVAon state decision making. These "late-to-innovate" states wereunique compared with the preponderance of other states thatinnovated earlier. Typical internal variables explained whyArizona and Illinois fell into gridlock over election reforminitially, but we must turn to other (external) explanationsto understand the ultimate decisions to innovate. Also, althoughthey are similar in being late to innovate, these two statesdisplay interesting differences as well.     

Recurring bills and the legislative process in the US congress

Recurring bills may be interpreted in two very different ways. First, there is the ‘legislative loser’ perspective, which posits that legislators introduce bills repeatedly for symbolic reasons, not intending or expecting them to go very far. Alternatively, there is the ‘softening up’ perspective, which assumes that legislators introduce bills more than once for policy reasons. They first test the waters, making a second attempt more successful. In this research article, we test these assumptions by examining the legislative impact of recurring bill status at various stages in the US House and Senate: initial committee attention, committee passage, attachment to an omnibus package and enactment. The evidence is mixed for the first stage of the process, while the findings for subsequent stages support the softening up interpretation. We discuss the implications for representation and future research.     

Winnowing in Environmental Policy: Jurisdictional Challenges and Opportunities

While scholars developed an understanding of the processes moving issues from the systemic to the institutional agenda, we know little about the inner workings of the institutional agenda. Winnowing theory addresses this gap by examining the leadership, bill sponsor, and contextual factors helping bills move through the institutional agenda. By expanding winnowing theory to incorporate a fragmented policy domain, the environment, we find that multiple referral status actually helps a bill's chances of receiving attention and passing through the committee.     

Jump-Starting Collaboration: The ABCD Initiative and the Provision of Child Development Services through Medicaid and Collaborators

Many policy problems require governmental leaders to forge vast networks beyond their own hierarchical institutions. This essay explores the challenges of implementation in a networked institutional setting and incentives to induce coordination between agencies and promote quality implementation. It describes the national evaluation of the Assuring Better Child Health and Development program, a state-based program intended to increase and enhance the delivery of child development services for low-income children through the health care sector, using Medicaid as its primary vehicle. Using qualitative evaluation methods, the authors found that all states implemented programs that addressed their stated goals and made changes in Medicaid policies, regulations, or reimbursement mechanisms. The program catalyzed interagency cooperation and coordination. The authors conclude that even a modest level of external support and technical assistance can stimulate significant programmatic change and interorganizational linkages within public agencies to enhance provision of child development services.     

Issues and Institutions: "Winnowing" in the U.S. Congress

“Winnowing” is the pre‐floor process by which Congress determines the small percentage of bills that will receive committee attention. The vast majority of proposals languish in this vital agenda‐setting stage, yet our understanding of winnowing is nascent. Why do some bills move forward while most fail? I examine that question here by developing and testing a theoretical framework of winnowing grounded in bounded rationality, which includes institutional and sponsor cues and also incorporates the unique issue milieu. A heteroskedastic probit model is utilized to analyze the winnowing fate of all bills introduced across five issue areas in the House and Senate from 1991 to 1998. The findings counter much received wisdom and suggest that the process is indeed cue based. The majority party helps structure this critical process in both chambers, though party effects appear stronger in the House. Contrary to recent work on the rise of Senate individualism, the seniority of the sponsor has significant effects in both the Senate and House, but again exhibits a stronger effect in the House. Surprisingly, presidential proposals are no more likely to survive than typical bills. The findings further suggest that the entrepreneurial efforts of bill sponsors breathe life into this process.