Communicating authoritarian elite cohesion

In this paper, we develop a theoretical framework to analyse the communicative imperatives authoritarian regimes face as a consequence of their self-inflicted opacities. The most important facts about the actors and factors that sustain authoritarian rule are unobservable. To demonstrate their power, authoritarian rulers have to render them visible. They have to dramatize their power and present on the front stage what they want people to know about the backstage of authoritarian politics. We conceptualize the communicative strategies of authoritarian rulers with a focus on the primary existential threats they face: the lateral threats that emanate from within the authoritarian elite. We illustrate dictators’ communicative repertoire with empirical material from communist Cuba from 2006 to 2011, during the critical juncture of leadership transition from Fidel Castro to his brother Raúl.     

The Political Rationale of Administrative Reforms: Parliamentary Support of Output Control in Switzerland

Sufficient political support is a sine qua non of comprehensive administrative reforms. However, while the pros and cons of administrative reform measures have been extensively discussed in theory and research, only little is known about the political process which determines whether or not administrative reforms are implemented at all. Against this background, the article aims at throwing light on the politicians' backgrounds and mindsets which account for their attitude towards administrative reforms. Referring to the theories of voting behaviour, socio-structural, socio-psychological, and rational choice factors by Swiss members of parliament are tested for their impact on the attitude towards new output control policies as part of wider administrative reforms. Findings help us understand the different fates of administrative reforms in the legislative process, and they make it possible to draw some essential conclusions for the design and implementation of future administrative reforms. In consequence of this, the article's findings are a significant contribution for the study of the political rationale of administrative reforms as well as the characteristics of political rationale in general.     

Local and regional public management reforms in Switzerland

Public management reforms at the local (community) and regional (canton) level in Switzerland almost all embrace elements of the new public management. In addition, in Switzerland, the merging of small communities as well as new developments such as electronic government are becoming apparent. The new public management model has been adapted for Swiss needs according to the perception of decision makers on problems that require solution in a Swiss context. NPM has developed, therefore, into rather different models in practice, aimed at the solution of these diverse problems. Foreign examples, such as the Dutch Tilburg Model and the German Neues Steuerungsmodell , played a major role at the start of this process, but have continuously lost their influence as actual models to be emulated. The most outstanding peculiarities of the Swiss reforms are an early and subsequent outcome focus together with the strong influence of direct democracy.     

Retributivism and Fallible Systems of Punishment

Abstract

I argue for the following, which I dub the “fallibility syllogism”: (1) All systems of criminal punishment that inflict suffering on the innocent are unjust from a desert-based, retributivist point of view. (2) All past or present human systems of criminal punishment inflict suffering on the innocent. (3) Therefore, all such human systems of criminal punishment are unjust from a desert-based, retributivist point of view. My argument for the first premise is organized in the following way. I define what a human system of punishment is. I offer a distinction between retributive and utilitarian approaches to punishment. I distinguish between weak retributivism embodied in the second premise and strong retributivism, which I argue is the basis for the weak version. I argue that on retributivist grounds, each case of punishment is just when it matches the seriousness of the wrongdoing of the offender and that systems of punishment are just from a retributivist point of view when there are no exceptions to this match-up. In making my case, I will use Kant's retributivism as the version of my choice, so I will spend some time showing that recent reinterpretations of Kant (arguing that he was not a thoroughgoing retributivist), even if they are correct, are consistent with my view. Ultimately, however, I argue that the better view is that Kant was a thoroughgoing retributivist.     

Measuring Democratic Consolidation

The concept of democratic consolidation has become a pivotal concept in comparative politics. In its most widespread acceptation, a “consolidated” democracy is one that is unlikely to break down. For all its apparent thinness and simplicity, this conceptualization poses considerable problems of operationalization and measurement. As the article argues, cholars have been relying on three basic strategies to assess the survival prospects of democratic regimes. They have been studying either behavioral, attitudinal, or structural foudnations of democratic consolidation. This article briefly examines those approaches that rely on different kinds of empirical evidence as well as on different causal assumptions. On the basis of a quick revision of recent Latin American experiences, it concludes that in common judgments about democratic consolidation, behavioral evidence seems to trump both attitudinal and structural data. Andreas Schedler is professor of political science at the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) in Mexico City. He also chairs the Research Committee on Concepts and Methods (C&M) of the International Political Science Association. His current research focuses on democratization and electoral governance in Mexico in comparative perspective. I am indebted to the Austrian Academy of Sciences for supporting work on this article through the Austrian Program for Advanced Research and Technology (APART). Also, I am most grateful to Ruth Berins Collier, Peter Burnell, David, Collier, Michael Coppedge, Larry Diamond, Graciela Ducatenzeiler, Francis Hagopian, Robert R. Kaufman, James Mahoney, Scott Mainwaring, Sebastián Mazzuca, Gerardo L. Munck, Martin Schürz, Richard Snyder, Kurt Weyland, and the anonymous reviewers ofSCID for their valuable comments. Many thanks, too, to Harold Waldrauch for sharing the New Democracies Barometer data. Naturally, though, all responsibility is mine.     

Performance Measurement in a Direct Democratic Environment: Local Government Reforms in Switzerland

Current international development in public management is characterized by a rare unanimity among countries. Trends in public administration, business administration, applied economics, and public law indicate a stronger emphasis on performance and a weakening of input-oriented analysis and steering. At the foundation of this development is performance measurement (PM). However, the political and administrative circumstance of its implementation differ widely. The following article deals with the implications of Swiss direct democracy for new approaches to public management and, specifically, performance measurement.     

Does strict judicial scrutiny involve thetu quoque fallacy?

To protect what it deems fundamental rights, the Supreme Court strictly scrutinizes legislation that impinges on these rights. The Court views such legislation as a means to some end the legislation seeks to accomplish. The Court requires that the statute be neither overinclusive nor underinclusive; the legislation may not affect more people than necessary to achieve its end, nor is the statute permitted to leave some people out in achieving its end.I argue that when legislation imposes burdens, its underinclusiveness is irrelevant, and that when it dispenses rewards its overinclusiveness is irrelevant, because those affected by the statute areex hypothesi deserving. One commits thetu quoque fallacy when one tries to infer that those affected by the law are undeserving from the fact that some deserving individuals were not affected by the statute.I show concretely how the Court has erred in specific cases. I also point out how the doctrine of judicial review prevents the Court from availing itself of the remedy that logic would demand.Lastly, I consider the possibility that the Court uses the doctrine of strict scrutiny to strike down legislation that the Court suspects has an impermissible motive. I conclude that if the Court has evidence of an impermissible motive, it could present an inductive argument for such a motive and strike the legislation down for that reason. Using thetu quoque fallacy does not advance the search for the impermissible motive.This paper was read at the American Philosophical Association Central Division Meeting in New Orleans on April 27, 1990.