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LEIF HELLAND 《European Journal of Political Research》2008,47(2):184-205
Abstract. The costly lobbying model of Potters and van Winden is confronted with data on lobbying interactions between local assemblies and the national assembly in Norway. A total of 239 interactions are studied. Survey responses by a large number of voters and politicians, as well as registry data on fiscal standing, demographics and elections are utilised. Two of the main predictions of the costly lobbying model gain support in the data. The probability of obtaining substantial discretionary funding from the central level increases: with decreasing conflict of interest between local and central politicians; and with the lobbying cost incurred by local politicians. For a given conflict and cost, however, the rate of lobbying success depends crucially on structural characteristics of the municipality. In particular, the success rate is significantly higher for poor municipalities located in national electoral districts with many seats per voter than for rich municipalities located in districts with few seats per voter. 相似文献
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LEIF LEWIN 《European Journal of Political Research》1988,16(1):29-49
Abstract. Rational choice theory springs from the utilitarian premises that what is best for society is nothing but the sum of what is best for each individual and what is best for the individual is best understood by the individual himself. Modern research, however, has often found both these premises to be invalid. Sometimes rational individual action leads to collectively irrational decisions. Occasionally, individual preferences emerge out of irrational motives. Other theories of the relation between man and society such as the doctrines of paternalism and the general will are therefore analyzed. The conclusion is that the present difficulties of rational choice theory can be attributed to its reluctance to integrate our empirical knowledge of the decision making of parties and organizations. There is room for a new theory that makes the rulers more independent of their voters than they are in rational choice theory, but more bound than they are in practice. 相似文献
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LEIF LEWIN 《European Journal of Political Research》1994,26(1):59-79
Abstract. Corporatism is a method to pacify intense minorities by giving them another opportunity to influence politics when they have no chance in parliament. This possibility helps to keep the system together; minorities get an incentive to stick to the system and social integration is promoted. During the 1980s we have, however, witnessed a gradual decline of this neocorporatist model of interest representation. Europe is approaching the American pluralist model instead. Sweden, once the prototype of the Social Democratic Corporatist State, is the best example of this change. 相似文献
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