Designing a Choice Architecture for Regulators

The emergence of behavioral public administration has led to increasing calls for public managers and policy makers to consider predictable cognitive biases when regulating individual behaviors or market transactions. Recognizing that cognitive biases can also affect the regulators themselves, this article attempts to understand how the institutional environment in which regulators operate interacts with their cognitive biases. In other words, to what extent does the “choice architecture” that regulators face reinforce or counteract predictable cognitive biases? Just as knowledge of behavioral insights can help regulators design a choice architecture that frames individual decisions to encourage welfare-enhancing choices, it may help governments understand and design institutions to counter cognitive biases in regulators that contribute to deviations from public interest policies. From these observations, the article offers some modest suggestions for improving the regulatory choice architecture.     

The Impact of Converting Categorical into Block Grants: The Lessons from the 314(d) Block Grant in the Partnership for Health Act

Section 314(d) of P. L. 89–749, (1966), the Partnershipfor Health Act, combined nine categorical health grants intoone block grant for health. The impact of section 314(d), according to data gathered forthis study, can be summarized as follows: the block grant increasedthe administrative flexibility of state health officials; statehealth planning agencies generally did not have a major influenceon the block grant; state health planning agencies located ingovernors' offices had less influence over the block grant thanthose located in state health departments; Congress did notsignificantly increase expenditures for the block grant; nationalinfluence was increased by creating health programs that couldpotentially have been made part of the block grant; and theblock grant did not generally result in a reordering of spendingpriorities. The best explanation for the unspectacular effect of combiningseveral categorical grants into one block grant was that, withoutnew resources, the substantial (and welcome) new administrativeflexibility given state officials was insufficient to producean important substantive reordering of program priorities.     

Was Idi Amin's Government a Terrorist Regime?

What does state terrorism look like? How do we distinguish it from other forms of mass state violence, such as repression or genocide? Based on the developing literature on state terrorism, this study presents three expectations that violence perpetrated by the state should meet if it is to be classified as state terrorism: these are (a) that the violence is perpetrated by agents of the state, (b) that the violence is visible, and (c) that state terrorism focused against a state's own citizens will be carried out by an autocratic, personalistic regime. Drawing substantially on a series of primary sources, this study demonstrates that Idi Amin's regime in Uganda from 1971 to 1979 did engage in state terrorism against its own citizens.     

The Supreme Court Prohibits Gerrymandering: A Gain or a Loss for the States?

The 1986 Davis v. Bandemer decision of the U.S. Supreme Courtdeclared partisan gerrymandering to be justiciable, but overruledthe federal district court's judgment that the Indiana legislativeredistricting plan was unconstitutional. The Court split onthe question of justiciability, and those justices who favoredjusticiability disagreed on the appropriate tests to apply intesting a districting plan for unfair partisan gerrymandering.The Court did not specify a clear measure and standard for outlawinggerrymandering. This gives state districting authorities anddistrict courts little guidance in dealing with gerrymandering.If, however, a successful measure and standard are developed,this action is likely to be beneficial to the states.