Specialization in juvenile careers: Markov results for a California cohort

In this paper, we examine the arrest careers through September 1985 of a highly active cohort of youth paroled by the California Youth Authority in the early 1980s. Our results are in some ways similar to and in other ways different from those reported by other researchers. We find that while adjacent transition matrices appear constant, the same cannot be said for nonadjacent matrices. We reject the first-order Markov hypothesis and find support for specialization in the statistical significance of the forward specialization coefficients. Our results also suggest that, in addition to transitions to the same type of offense, an oscillating pattern of offending is common for our subjects. We also compare the transition matrices of three racial/ethnic and four regional groups. These results indicate differences in the patterns of offending by the racial/ethnic groups in our sample and similar offense-transition behavior in three of the four regions that differs significantly from that of the fourth region.Points of view are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policy of the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, or U.S. General Accounting Office.     

A generalized model of rent-seeking behavior

In this paper I present a formal analysis of rent-seeking games in which the players' valuations for the prize are represented as vectors. The players in this game are risk neutral and may not be indifferent to who wins the contestable rent if it is someone else. Both Tullock's original rent-seeking model and the public goods rent-seeking model by Katz et al. turn out to be special cases of this more general model.     

Cooperative rent-seeking

The paper introduces a concept of “efficiency set” in the context of group decisions and analyses its properties. If the set contains a single element, then the Borda rule finds it. Otherwise, the group needs a value function to choose from the efficient alternatives. Two value functions, with considerations for the number of participants who are badly affected by the choice, have been discussed. It turns out that the consistency axiom of group choice imposes a constraint, on the form of the value function, with questionable normative significance.     

Stackelberg rent-seeking

In this paper I present a formal analysis of rent-seeking games in which the players do not move simultaneously. I consider rent-seeking situations where the players are risk neutral and may value the prize differently. The subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in this Stackelberg game provides several surprising and interesting results. I extend the problem to deal with cases of incomplete information concerning the value a player has for the politically contestable rent.     

A survival model of pretrial failure

This paper examines the likelihood of rearrest during the pretrial period with a model that depends on both time elapsed since release and on individual and case characteristics. Using data on a sample of male arrestees released on recognizance in the District of Columbia in 1984, we apply a survival or hazard model to the problem of predicting pretrial rearrest. We are particularly interested in whether drug use, as measured by urinalysis at arrest, is predictive of pretrial rearrest and its timing. Results show, for example, that drug use or a charge for larceny is associated with high risk levels in the period immediately following release. In our data, the number of prior convictions exerts a strong effect on rearrest risk throughout the pretrial period, but the initial high risk associated with being on probation or parole or having pending charges decreases rapidly over the course of a year at risk.