The Competent Cabinet? Ministers in Sweden and the Problem of Competence and Democracy

The competence of Cabinet members in general, and of Swedish Cabinet members in particular, is frequently put into doubt despite the fact that little systematic research exists on the topic. The meaning of 'competence' in this context is of course controversial. This study is confined to the occurrence of 'expertise': indicators of professional experience from the subject areas for which the minister is responsible. The sample includes 182 Swedish Cabinet appointments from 1917 to 2004, covering the full range of ministers concerned with economic and social affairs. The indicators used include previous political experience from the relevant policy field as well as relevant educational and professional backgrounds. When these measures are used, the resulting pattern is that few government ministers are truly amateurs at the time of entering the Cabinet. Moreover, there are few signs that the level of expertise so understood has undergone any dramatic changes during the time period. These results speak against the views endorsed by some scholars that 'the problem of power of politicians is power without competence'. If it is true that political experience has the potential to breed expertise in particular policy fields, it cannot also be true that the recruitment of full-time politicians as Cabinet Ministers indicates the absence of expertise.     

Irregular migration and democracy: the case for inclusion

This article examines the democratic status of irregular immigrants from the vantage point of different models of democratic inclusion. The argument developed is that irregular immigrants are in fact members of the democratic state by virtue of being subjected to the legally binding norms in the territory of the state. The extension of the vote and other political rights to irregular immigrants nevertheless remains problematic due to their ‘illegal’ status. Because this status follows from the restrictive border policies implemented by most contemporary states, it shows that the ideal of democratic inclusion is scarcely reconcilable with a policy of restrictive cross-border movement. The conclusion defended in the article is that the interest in keeping borders restricted reduces the prospects for democratic inclusion in contemporary states.     

The Subjects of Collectively Binding Decisions: Democratic Inclusion and Extraterritorial Law

Citizenship and residency are basic conditions for political inclusion in a democracy. However, if democracy is premised on the inclusion of everyone subject to collectively binding decisions, the relevance of either citizenship or residency for recognition as a member of the polity is uncertain. The aim of this paper is to specify the conditions for being subject to collective decisions in the sense relevant to democratic theory. Three conceptions of what it means to be subject to collectively binding decisions are identified and examined, referring to those subject to legal duties and legal powers or to those subject to legal duties and state institutions. The contrast between them is most clearly illustrated in relation to non‐residents, those not present in the territory of the state. The extraterritorial dimension of the law thus highlights a fundamental ambiguity in the theory of democracy concerning the extension of political rights.     

Why should Austria be different from Germany? the two recent nationality reforms in contrast

The article compares and evaluates the two recent reforms of nationality law in Austria and Germany. Before the changes both countries were very similar cases in terms of their nationality and immigration policy. Both relied on strict ‘jus sanguinis’, the principle of descent which is anchored in their nationality laws. One implication of jus sanguinis is that it constantly reproduces ‘new-born’ foreigners, as the only way for foreign residents to obtain national citizenship is via naturalisation. This includes the obligation to renounce any former nationality. In its recent amendment in 2000, Germany has softened the principle of descent by introducing limited ‘jus soli’ with the obligation to opt for one nationality at the age of 23 at the latest. Austria, on the other hand, has stuck to its tradition and introduced restricted reform. The article will outline the context of the two amendments. Why has the outcome been so different although both countries have faced so many similar experiences and circumstances? I will trace the development of both amendments and highlight the backgrounds of these two so contrasting decisions: two different attempts to deal with naturalisation of long-term immigrants and new-born foreigners.