The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Protection: The Case of Software

The end of the twentieth century was marked by a sea change in global governance in the realm of intellectual property rights (IPRs). Whereas countries historically retained substantial autonomy with regard to what they defined as intellectual "property" and the rights granted to the owners of intellectual property, the 1990s witnessed the establishment of new global obligations regarding national practices. This paper focuses on the case of software "piracy" to assess the mechanisms by which the new global obligations for the treatment of IPRs are transmitted from the international to the national levels. We first consider a set of national-level factors that many scholars have shown to be important determinants of IPR policy. We then supplement the standard emphasis on domestic factors with an analysis of new transnational factors: countries' multilateral obligations under the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and bilateral pressures from the United States to increase the protection of IPRs. Population-averaged panel data models are used to assess the effects of these national and transnational determinants on levels of software piracy in 80 countries from 1994 to 2002. Our results indicate that membership in the WTO and bilateral pressures from the United States—particularly pressures that offer reciprocal concessions—lead to substantial increases in levels of protection in rich and poor countries. There is, in short, a new international political economy of intellectual property.     

Electoral studies and democratic theory reconsidered

In recent years, political theorists and social scientists have sought to assess the contemporary relevance and validity of a so-called classical doctrine of democracy in light of empirical evidence emphasizing the apathy, ignorance, incompetence, and/or authoritarian inclinations of ordinary citizens. Elite or revisionist theories have urged a drastic attenuation of the participatory commitments of classical democratic theory in light of this evidence. Defenders of classical democratic theory have often accepted this evidence as substantially accurate, staking their hopes upon future possibilities for the development of mass political competence in the democratically reconstituted structures of a participatory society. This article suggests that a critique of revisionist democratic theory can be developed solely on the basis of currently available findings. After reviewing an important body of evidence, we conclude that the distribution of political competence between mass and elite is far less unequal than has been assumed by revisionist proponents of elite democratic theory and conceded by their participatory critics.     

Interpersonal Correlates of Peer Victimization Among Young Adolescents

Empathy, prosocial behavior, the number of friends, self-reported popularity, and various forms of interpersonal forgiveness were examined as predictors of peer victimization among 52 7th and 8th graders attending a private school. Popularity was the strongest individual predictor of teacher-reported victimization with high popularity associated with low victimization. Malestudents reported significantly higher rates of victimization than females, prompting the decision to examine correlates of self-reported victimization separately by gender. Interpersonal forgiveness scores were the strongest predictors of self-reported victimization; however, different forms of forgiveness were the greatest predictors of male and female self-reported victimization. Implications are discussed.     

The Reinvention of Public Personnel Administration: An Analysis of the Diffusion of Personnel Management Reforms in the States

Reform is a common theme in American public administration. During the twentieth century at least 12 major administrative reforms have taken place at the federal level and countless others in state and local governments. Frequently, these reforms have addressed the operation of public personnel management systems. Recent efforts associated with the reinventing government movement, for example, have proposed numerous alterations to civil service rules and procedures, and many jurisdictions have implemented significant changes in their personnel practices. This article examines the extent to which these kinds of personnel reforms have been implemented by state governments. A reform index is developed to document the considerable variation among the states in their approach to personnel practices. Several state characteristics are associated with scores on this index, including legislative professionalism, which bears a positive relationship to reform, and the level of unemployment within a state and the proportion of state employees associated with public employee unions, which are both negatively associated with reform.     

Administrative Discretion and Active Representation: An Expansion of the Theory of Representative Bureaucracy

Recent studies of the theory of representative bureaucracy have focused on active representation, whereby administrators in public organizations work to advance the interests of particular groups, achieving policy outcomes that directly address the needs of those groups. The concept of administrative discretion is central to these studies, as an administrator must have the discretion to produce results that reflect the values and beliefs of these groups. While the presence of discretion is often implied in these studies, few have examined it explicitly. Using data from the Farmer's Home Administration, we explore whether administrators who perceive themselves as having more discretion enact policy outcomes that are more representative of minority interests. The results strongly support the conclusion that administrators who perceive themselves as possessing significant discretion and who assume the role of minority representative in their agencies are more likely to enact policy outcomes that favor minority interests.