Introduction: a symposium on the predatory state

Economists have adopted two broad perspectives on the state: contractual (i.e., provider of public goods and services) and predatory (coercive and extractive). By a predatory state, we mean a state that promotes the private interests of dominant groups within the state (such as politicians, the army and bureaucrats) or influential private groups with strong lobbying powers. Neo-institutional economists support an extended version of the contractual perspective in which the state is not simply a ‘benevolent dictator’ but may itself be composed of predators. However, it considers predation as only a means to promote protection. By contrast, a predatory vision of the state argues that while protection and predation are two faces of the same coin, a predatory state protects only to promote its predation on the private sector. This symposium explores how a predatory approach to the state can shed light on all types of state, from liberal democratic to authoritarian and failed ones, both in the past and present.

     

The Revival of the Student Movement in Post-Revolutionary Iran

In April 1980 government forces invaded college campuses and closed down the universities for a three-year period under the pretext of a cultural revolution. A post-revolutionary student movement was able to appear as new to the political scene only as of early 1997. This essay provides a sociological analysis of the post-revolutionary student movement in Iran by focusing on: (1) the general structural role of university campuses and, in particular, the role of the Office for Consolidation of Unity (O.C.U.) in mobilizing the movement; 2) the 1997 election of President Khatami which provided a new political opportunity; and 3) the new reformist/legalistic political culture of the movement which allows it to adapt to the complex challenges of everyday politics in Iran.     

Appropriation, violent enforcement, and transaction costs: a critical survey

This paper focuses on the extension of transaction costs to appropriative activity and coercive power in the property rights approach. It has been argued that including the costs of appropriation and violent enforcement in transaction costs is based on the assumption that Coaseian bargaining can be extended to any institutional scenario, i.e., voluntary as well as coercive exchange. However, voluntary transactions cannot capture the logic of coercive power. This means that the assumption of an efficient political market is not valid, and that the ??political Coase theorem?? lacks the logical consistency to provide a cornerstone for political theory.     

Introduction: a special issue in honoring Janos Kornai

Public Choice - We ask whether fiscal rules constrain incumbents from using fiscal policy tools for reelection purposes. Using data on fiscal rules provided by the IMF for a sample of 77 (advanced...     

Socialism and Kornai’s revolutionary perspective

Public Choice - In this paper, I argue that the principal message of Janos Kornai’s work was to underscore that the dysfunctional properties of socialism are endemic and systemic, and cannot...     

Determination of impurities in illicit methamphetamine samples seized in Iran

In this study fifty samples of crystalline methamphetamine obtained from antinarcotics police of Iran seized during the year 2010 were analyzed. In order to determine the chemical characteristics of these samples, anion test, Gas Chromatography-Mass Spectrometry (GC-MS) and Liquid Chromatography-Mass Spectrometry (LC-MS) were carried out on the samples. All of the samples containing methamphetamine tested positive for chloride anion. The range of methamphetamine hydrochloride content in these samples was 33-95%. One sample out of 50 contained no methamphetamine. The fact that 1,2-dimethyl-3-phenylaziridine was the most frequently found impurity in the analyzed samples, indicates that most of the methamphetamine samples seized in Iran have been synthesized from pseudoephedrine as starting material.