2001年经济危机之后阿根廷的形势

首先 ,请允许我感谢中国社会科学院国际合作局和拉丁美洲研究所 ,邀请我与尊贵的同事、学者和中国党政领导一道 ,参加这次国际学术论坛。我们十分清楚 ,无论对中拉关系在各个领域的发展 ,还是对拉美人民的福祉来说 ,召开本次论坛的倡议都具有重要意义。我们十分积极地参加这次活动 ,企望能够使人们更好地了解我们问题的所在 ,了解我们怎样一起着手解决这些问题 ,这将有助于我们为维护持久的利益 ,实现稳定、持续和长久发展的目标而努力。我谈的主题是“2 0 0 1年经济危机之后阿根廷的形势”。我国历史上规模最大的这次危机是怎样产生的 ?我…     

The political economy of hyperinflation in Venezuela

Public Choice - We study the Venezuelan hyperinflation as a political phenomenon with distributional and efficiency effects. The hyperinflation originated in publicly financed benefits for the...     

Turnout Across Democracies

World democracies widely differ in legislative, executive, and legal institutions. Different institutional environments induce different mappings from electoral outcomes to the distribution of power. We explore how these mappings affect voters' participation in an election. We show that the effect of such institutional differences on turnout depends on the distribution of voters' preferences. We uncover a novel contest effect: Given the preferences distribution, turnout increases and then decreases when we move from a more proportional to a less proportional power‐sharing system; turnout is maximized for an intermediate degree of power sharing. Moreover, we generalize the competition effect, common to models of endogenous turnout: Given the institutional environment, turnout increases in the ex ante preferences evenness, and more so when the overall system has lower power sharing. These results are robust to a wide range of modeling approaches, including ethical voter models, voter mobilization models, and rational voter models.     

Incumbents' Interests and Gender Quotas

The introduction of mandatory gender quotas in party lists is a reform that many countries have recently adopted or have been considering. The electoral system affects the incumbents' incentives to make such reforms, their details, and their effectiveness. We show that male incumbents can actually expect an increased incumbency advantage when gender quotas are introduced, if they are elected through single‐member district majority rule. On the other hand, no expectation of male advantage can reduce the incumbents' fear of being replaced if they are elected through closed‐list proportional representation. As France has both electoral systems, we validate the above argument using a formal model of constitutional design as well as an empirical analysis of the legislative elections in France, displaying the existence of male bias in the last three elections. We also show that parity may have Assembly composition effects and policy effects that vary with the electoral system.