New State Equality: The Ambiguous History of a Constitutional Principle

In Coyle v. Smith (1911), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled thatCongress could not impose admissions conditions on new statesthat detracted from their equal standing in the union. Previously,the Court had deferred to Congress' authority over federal territoryand over its own membership. Before the Civil War, federal interestsin new states—particularly with respect to public lands—weresecured through admissions conditions. Later, however, admissions"compacts" became increasingly redundant; the Court groundedfederal property claims in the new states on the "rules andregulations" provision of the Constitution. Meanwhile, in aseries of decisions, the Court began to uphold the "municipalsovereignty" of the territories against congressional interference.Congress' authority in the territories was progressively limitedto that of acting as "trustee" for future states. These doctrinaldevelopments culminated in Coyle. The Court challenged Congress'right to set invidious admission conditions and asserted itsown jurisdiction over the state-making process. The new stateequality principle thus became "constitutional" as the Courtextended its authority. I wish to thank Herman Belz, University of Maryland, for helpfulcriticism.