Modeling Other-Regarding Preferences and an Experimental Test

Behavior inconsistent with self-interest has beenobserved in many contexts. We argue thatmodels designed to cope with theseanomalies are inadequate to deal with avariety of social values. Our extension ofthe Fehr & Schmidt `inequity aversion'model is applied to results from dictatorexperiments in which the money to bedivided is generated by the efforts ofpaired individuals in either one or tworooms. This production leads to sharingbehavior qualitatively different from thatfound in other dictator experiments. Thepattern of sharing can be explained byentitlements, equity, and the credibilityof the experiment.     

Redistributive politics: A theory of taxation for an incumbent in a democracy

In order to maximize votes, incumbent politicians design and implement redistributional programs. These programs benefit some voters at the expense of others. In the simple two group (or tax payers and beneficiaries) case we identify the nature of vote maximizing transfer policies. This model's basic approach is shown to hold for multiple group models as well. Strategic implications for the organizers of sub groups of the population (or group leaders) are developed. Other extensions of the model are discussed. qu]Where the budget is clever is in its detail. Each little measure is designed to hurt (but not too much) people who are not politically important, while tossing a bone to people who are. You can see this in a host of different ways.     

Public choice and three ethical properties of politics

Three major public choice findings about politics are analyzed for their implications regarding ethics and ethical analysis. The assumption that governments supply collective goods, and the ensuing implication that it is rational to stay ignorant is shown to decrease the moral involvement of the individual in political behavior. The difficulty of obtaining a stable political outcome with regard to distributive issues is shown to affect the relationship between fair political procedures and the attainment of justice. It is argued that the pursuit of justice may require the abandonment of procedural fairness. Implications of these findings for ethical reasoning are then discussed. Finally, questions regarding the relationship between the rather imperfect findings of the public choice theorist and their ethical implications for the political philosopher are raised.