Connecting Minorities to the Swiss Federal System: A Frozen Conception of Representation and the Problem of "Requisite Variety"

Heterogeneous Switzerland is often portrayed as a model of successfulnation-building. Two major institutions ensure the representationof federal units within the federal political system: the Councilof States branch of the bicameral legislature, and the "doublemajority" of popular and cantonal votes needed in constitutionalreferenda. It was expected that both mechanisms would countercentrifugal forces possibly created by the self-government ofsubnational groups. Historical analysis shows, however, thatsince these institutions were established, some important socialtransformations have occurred, with perverse effects on minorityrepresentation and on cleavage accommodation. The Council ofStates has come to amplify the influence of established politicalforces, instead of defending minority influence. The "doublemajority" now gives excessive veto power to minorities no longersocially relevant, at the expense of newer, more needy groups.National cohesion and consensus democracy, in short, risk beingeroded rather than strengthened by these core institutions ofthe Swiss federal system.     

Problems of Democratic Accountability in Network and Multilevel Governance

Abstract:  Most studies converge on the growth of processes of 'multilevel governance' (MLG) in policy making, related to the often combined trends towards supranationalism and regionalism. Such processes are usually analysed under the angle of their efficiency, while their impact on the quality of democracy is neglected. This article first defines the concepts of multilevel governance and accountability, and then identifies the various dimensions of the latter. It further argues that MLG generates novel forms of accountability, but undermines its democratic dimension mainly for the following reasons: the weak visibility of MLG networks, their selective composition and the prevalence of peer over public forms of accountability.     

From Corporatism to Partisan Politics: Social Policy Making under Strain in Switzerland

The literature on neo‐corporatist agreements in social and labor market policy in the 1990s points to a decline of concertation in European countries with a long‐standing tradition of corporatist negotiation. This article identifies a similar trend in Switzerland and argues that three destabilizing factors account for it: 1) retrenchment pressure and ideological polarization prevent compromises; 2) the emergence of new social demands and interests challenges the homogeneity and legitimacy of peak organizations and thus their bargaining power; 3) increasing media coverage tends to open up the traditionally confidential and selective sphere of corporatist negotiation and weakens the social partners’ ability to reach agreements. The impact of these factors on neo‐corporatist bargaining is tested in Switzerland, a case where corporatist negotiations used to be particularly decisive in social policy making. Empirical evidence comes from a cross‐time comparison of two major social policies: Unemployment insurance and pension reforms in the 1970s and in the 1990s. In the last decade, the main locus of decision‐making shifted from the sphere of interest groups to partisan politics. In parliament, the political parties were able to draft bills enjoying wide acceptance thanks to compensations offered to groups particularly vulnerable to new social risks.     

Government or governance? The case of the French local political system

The structure of the local political system has completely changed since decentralisation. However, the presentation of peripheral power made by Pierre Grémion before decentralisation has not really been updated. Most academic research concentrates on either rural or urban issues. From the analysis of the current attempt of the French state to enhance co‐operation between communes, it is possible to make a general presentation of the current decentralised political system. Local authorities are increasingly part of a multi‐actor system combining many public and private institutions. However, they also are developing a specific political mode of organisation and relationship with one another. Local governments are the political cores of the multi‐actor system, in charge of local management.     

Parties,the state and society in Greece: Continuity within change

The new Greek party system which emerged after the restoration of democracy in 1974 is characterised by a combination of features indicative of both continuity and change in comparison with the party system that existed before the military coup of 1967. This article concludes that in the present phase the contribution of parties to institutional consolidation and the stability of party identification, though not negligible, remains uncertain. It is likely to be influenced by variables both internal and external to the political system, relating to party interaction and to the relationship of parties with state and society.     

After citizenship: autonomy of migration,organisational ontology and mobile commons

This paper explores the relevance of the autonomy of migration approach for understanding the role of citizenship in the sovereign control of mobility. There is an insurgent configuration of ordinary experiences of mobility emerging against this regime of control. At its core is the sharing of knowledge and infrastructures of connectivity, affective cooperation, mutual support and care among people on the move. The sovereign regime of mobility control is displaced on the level on which it attempts to take hold: the everyday movements of migrants. The frenetic fixation with security is challenged by the creation of common worlds of existence; the obsession with governance is replaced by inhabiting social spaces below the radar of existing political structures. This paper attempts to contribute to a reconstruction of this mundane ontology of transmigration, an ontology which we will describe as the mobile commons of migration.     

On the Politicisation of the European Union: Lessons from Consociational National Polities

The debate on the politicisation of the EU should consider its consociational nature. Comparing the EU to Switzerland and Belgium, this article discusses S. Hix's and S. Bartolini's contrasting views on politicisation. S. Hix's recipe for bipolar politicisation is based on some incorrect assumptions. It is not obvious that the EU is evolving towards more Left–Right polarisation. Even if this were the case, the nature of the EU implies that compromises are indispensable. Therefore, Hix's suggestions would not suffice to clarify political choice, and Euroscepticism would not be reduced. The consociational nature of the EU also makes less credible S. Bartolini's fears of possible negative consequences for governability. The politicisation of constitutive issues can even help to integrate Eurosceptic segments of public opinion. The authors suggest a middle way regarding EU politicisation based on lessons from consociational polities, and the coupling of a system of ‘negotiation democracy’ with mechanisms of direct popular participation.