Making Sense of Greek Austerity

The process of approving a Greek drawing on funds provided by the international community is now familiar. There is concern about the prospect of securing an agreement between the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Union (EU), the European Central Bank (ECB), and Greece, which satisfies all parties. This paper suggests that all parties to the agreement have interests in an orderly resolution of the Greek crisis that keeps Greece in the Eurozone. Furthermore, it argues that disagreements and delay before eleventh‐hour agreements can best be explained politically. The paper first demonstrates how Greece, the IMF, and the EU each have a clear interest in finding an orderly solution to the Greek crisis that allows it to remain in the Eurozone. It then outlines the incremental nature of the package and its strategic benefit both for the European banking sector, and governments in Greece and the Eurozone more broadly.     

The Economic Consequences of a Hung Parliament: Lessons from February 1974

The British general election on 10 May 2010 delivered Britain's first hung Parliament since February 1974, and in the run‐up, the Conservative party made much of the economic difficulties Britain faced in the second half of the 1970s in order to try and convince voters that anything other than a Tory vote would risk exposing the nation to the discipline of financial markets. The question of how well equipped an exceptional kind of British government is to deal with exceptional economic circumstances is therefore of paramount importance. This paper argues that the Conservative party made too much of the impact of the 1974 hung Parliament in precipitating subsequent economic crisis and suggests that as such, there is no reason to assume that the Conservative–Liberal coalition government is ill‐equipped to manage British economic affairs in difficult circumstances.     

Empirical Determinants of Bicameral Sequence in State Legislatures

In a previous article (Rogers 1998), I showed that the bicameral chamber that originates enacted legislation tends to realize policy outcomes closer to the preference of its median legislator than does the chamber that votes second on legislation. All things being equal, this “first‐mover advantage” implies that each chamber could be expected to originate roughly half of all enacted legislation. But all other things are not equal in U.S. state bicameral legislatures. Drawing on an expanded dataset, I innovate and test a number of additional hypotheses related to bicameral voting sequence. My results account for the effects of constitutional, institutional, and electoral variables on bicameral sequence.     

Lessons for parents,teachers, and juvenile probation officers: seven ideal criteria for constructively evaluating discipline

By delineating a basic set of terms, this paper seeks to enhance the appreciation, understanding, and discussion of constructive discipline. Advocating initiative by our nation's juvenile probation officers, the author views this cadre of some 18,000 JPOs as an important catalyst in the never-ending task of delinquency prevention. In an era of growing harshness toward youthful offenders, we must remain cognizant that much of the chronic violence which we justly abhor has roots in prior parental malpractice. Our approach provides a model to place three major role-players — parents, teachers, JPOs — all “on the same page,” to borrow a popular metaphor. We focus on seven criteria for evaluating discipline by each participant, while furnishing a supplementary framework to amplify task awareness. Despite already having excessive caseloads, JPOs are encouraged to serve as outreach agents in a common cause. The tables seek to provide officers a basic set of “handouts” for distribution at panels, workshops, seminars, school visits, and parent conferences. Parents should especially appreciate that the seven criteria give guidelines not only for their disciplinary practices, but also for those of teachers and JPOs     

The Impact of Bicameralism on Legislative Production

It is generally accepted by scholars, as well as by cameral partisans, that adding a second chamber to an otherwise unicameral legislative process will decrease the volume of laws that a legislature enacts. This study challenges the conventional wisdom. First, I offer a simple theoretical argument that shows that when second chambers can originate as well as reject legislation, bicameralism will have an indeterminate impact on legislative production. Second, I provide historical data gathered from the four U.S. states that have experienced cameral transitions. Although very rudimentary, the historical evidence, when coupled with the theoretical argument, raises serious doubt regarding the traditional claim that bicameralism reduces the production of legislation.     

The information superhighway: Some public policy issues for the Commonwealth

This article examines the significance for Commonwealth governments of the emerging Information Superhighway. It reviews the nature and the scope of developments in the field of information technology, then considers policy questions raised by the existence of the Internet and eventually, of the Information Superhighway. Governments of developing countries run the risk of being excluded from the benefits of information technology unless they frame National Information Infrastructures. (© 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.)