Rationality,Power, Management and Symbols: Four Images of Regulatory Impact Assessment

Impact assessment is the pivotal instrument in the recent wave of regulatory reforms labeled ‘better regulation’. Although the economics of impact assessment has been the subject of a vast literature, less is known about its political properties. Within a comparative framework, this article provides conjectures on four images of impact assessment – that is, rational policy making, political control of the bureaucracy, public management reform, and symbolic action. Looking at six countries with a long experience of impact assessment and the European Union, the article first builds expectations about the diffusion of the images across countries, and then proceeds to measurement by using both objective and interpretative/subjective indicators. The findings seem to support the public management reform image – a conclusion that suggests further specifications about administrative traditions and change. Sweden and Denmark are not using impact assessment to foster instrumental rationality or increase the political control of bureaucracies and, together with the Netherlands, rank high on the symbolic action scale. The United States – and to a lesser extent Canada and the United Kingdom – have a multi‐purpose approach to impact assessment. The case of the European Union defies prior expectations, showing much more usage than anticipated.     

Explaining the content of impact assessment in the United Kingdom: Learning across time,sectors, and departments

While several studies have documented how evidence‐based policy instruments affect public policy, less research has focused on what causes changes over time in the analyses mandated by the instruments, especially in Britain. Thus, we take the analytical content of a pivotal regulatory reform instrument (impact assessment) as a dependent variable, draw on learning as a conceptual framework, and explain the dynamics of learning processes across departments, policy sectors, and time. Empirically, our study draws on a sample of 517 impact assessments produced in Britain (2005–2011). Experience and capacity in different departments matter in learning processes. Guidelines also matter, but moderately so. Departments specialize in their core policy sectors when performing regulatory analysis, but some have greater analytical capacity overall. Peripheral departments invest more in impact assessment than core executive departments. The presence of a regulatory oversight body enhances the learning process. Elections have different effects, depending on the context in which they are contested. These findings contribute to the literature on regulation, policy learning, and policy instruments.     

The code of conduct against harmful tax competition: open method of coordination in disguise?

The European Union is experimenting with new, non‐binding policy instruments in business taxation, namely a voluntary code of conduct among member states against harmful tax competition. This article raises the question to what extent can the code be considered a manifestation of the open method of coordination (OMC)? Is an open method (based on guidelines, peer review, best practice, benchmarking, learning and diffusion of shared beliefs among policy‐makers) emerging as a new governance architecture in tax policy? If so, what can the code achieve in terms of policy learning and convergence? There are similarities between the code and the open method of coordination – especially with reference to guidelines, peer review, timetables and the identification of ‘worst practice’. However, the political logic of the code does not fit in well with the OMC aims of participatory governance and social learning. In terms of achievements, the code has contributed to the creation of a community of discourse and the diffusion of shared beliefs about what constitutes ‘acceptable’ and ‘harmful’ tax competition. Convergence at the level of discourse, however, should not be confused with convergence of actual tax policies in the member states.     

Steering the Community Regulatory System: the Challenges Ahead

This article reviews the process of regulatory reform in the European Union (EU). The main argument is that EU initiatives have been cast in a rather narrow conceptual framework, limited to issues such as simplification and better law-making. Although important, these issues are only a component of the wider task of governing regulation. Therefore I introduce and discuss three proposals for re-casting the debate on EU regulation. First, the focus should be shifted from ‘better law-making’ to ‘better regulatory policy-making’. Second, regulatory management, rather than simplification, should represent the strategic objective of EU institutions. Third, regulatory reform should be accompanied by administrative reform. Consequently, the relative impenetrability of the Commission to administrative reform represents a serious obstacle to regulatory reform.     

The many uses of regulatory impact assessment: A meta‐analysis of EU and UK cases

Research on regulation has crossed paths with the literature on policy instruments, showing that regulatory policy instruments contain cognitive and normative beliefs about policy. Thus, their usage stacks the deck in favor of one type of actor or one type of regulatory solution. In this article, we challenge the assumption that there is a predetermined relationship between ideas, regulatory policy instruments, and outcomes. We argue that different combinations of conditions lead to different outcomes, depending on how actors use the instrument. Empirically, we analyze 31 EU and UK case studies of regulatory impact assessment (RIA) – a regulatory policy instrument that has been pivotal in the so‐called better regulation movement. We distinguish four main usages of RIA, that is, political, instrumental, communicative, and perfunctory. We find that in our sample instrumental usage is not so rare and that the contrast between communicative and political usages is less stark than is commonly thought. In terms of policy recommendations, our analysis suggests that there may be different paths to desirable outcomes. Policymakers should therefore explore different combinations of conditions leading to the usages they deem desirable rather than arguing for a fixed menu of variables.     

Limits to EU technocratic regulation?

Abstract. This article has three main objectives. Firstly, it seeks to re–formulate the debate on technocracy in the European Union by drawing upon the concept of the EU regulatory state as developed by Majone (1996). Secondly, it illustrates the limits and tensions of a once politicised technocratic policy–making process by tracing the formulation of media ownership regulation. Although media ownership policy has been presented by the European Commission as a typical regulatory policy, it has followed a more politicised path than previous EU regulatory policies. This implies that media ownership policy does not follow the model of technocratic regulation presented by Majone in his characterisation of the EU regulatory state. Thirdly, the paper contributes to the debate on EU regulation by suggesting a new typology of regulatory policies in the EU. In the conclusion, it is argued that politicisation (which includes inefficiency and prolonged conflict) may be the price that the EU is forced to pay in its progress toward a more democratic polity.     

Policy Transfer in the European Union: Institutional Isomorphism as a Source of Legitimacy

This article examines public policy in the European Union (EU) by drawing upon the framework of policy transfer, which has been recently refined by comparativists, and the concept of isomorphism developed within organizational theory. Three case studies—namely, the single currency, tax policy and media ownership policy—are discussed and compared with the aim of assessing the potential of isomorphism for the analysis of policy dif-fusion. The author argues that European institutions, which have a serious limitation in terms of legitimacy, stimulate policy transfer by catalyzing isomorphic processes. Policy transfer, however, is constrained when there are no national cases to be imitated. Yet European institutions, most notably the European Commission, can overcome the problem by "inseminating" solutions into national political systems.     

Steering the Community Regulatory System: the Challenges Ahead

This article reviews the process of regulatory reform in the European Union (EU). The main argument is that EU initiatives have been cast in a rather narrow conceptual framework, limited to issues such as simplification and better law-making. Although important, these issues are only a component of the wider task of governing regulation. Therefore I introduce and discuss three proposals for re-casting the debate on EU regulation. First, the focus should be shifted from 'better law-making' to 'better regulatory policy-making'. Second, regulatory management, rather than simplification, should represent the strategic objective of EU institutions. Third, regulatory reform should be accompanied by administrative reform. Consequently, the relative impenetrability of the Commission to administrative reform represents a serious obstacle to regulatory reform.