Constitutional analysis: The power index approach

Abstract. A power index approach to the EU institutions gives a new perspective upon the EU institutions and their future reform. Using a standard power measure, the Banzhaf index, we show that in a group of states as the EU council, the voting power of a member state is equal to twice the individual power to block multiplied by the group's collective power to change. Political power of the member states is calculated under alternative constitutional rules for the EU, where cooperative game theory allows the derivation of power equivalences. We suggest that simple majority should be used more often in the EU council.     

Childhood Physical and Verbal Mistreatment,Psychological Symptoms,and Substance Use: Sex Differences and the Moderating Role of Attachment

Sex differences in sequelae associated with levels of childhood physical mistreatment and verbal mistreatment were examined in a non-clinical sample of 272 university students. We predicted and found that both forms of mistreatment are related to attachment difficulties as well as various adverse psychological symptoms. We hypothesized, based on attachment theory, that the strength of a child’s attachment to one parent would moderate adverse emotional sequelae of mistreatment by the other parent. This prediction was only partially supported. Strength of the mother-daughter attachment moderated several of the adverse psychological symptoms in response to mistreatment by fathers, but mother-son attachment did not so moderate. Strength of the father-son attachment also did not moderate the symptoms associated with mistreatment perpetrated by mothers, nor did the father-daughter attachment. These results suggest that, among other relevant factors, sex differences should also be taken into account in treatment and prevention efforts.     

A Brief Introduction to Veit Ludwig von Seckendorff (1626–1692)

Veit Ludwig von Seckendorff is widely regarded as the ‘founder’ of early economics in Germany, of Cameralism. Having survived the horrors of the Thirty Years’ War and the resulting economic, political, and moral breakdown of society, Seckendorff conceived of a holistic science of public administration fit to reconstruct the more than 300 independent German principalities recognized by the Peace of Westphalia. The science he envisioned was both theoretical and practical, covering all the needs of a small principality. The same union of active and contemplative characterizes Seckendorff’s own life, as he devoted himself both to administrating the Court of Gotha and the University of Halle, both to write an “owner’s handbook” to small principalities and one of the most celebrated defenses of Lutheranism. This introduction will explore how these many facets came together in the figure of Seckendorff, what his main influences were, and how the historical context helped shape his writings.     

Exploring the Genesis of Economic Innovations: The Religious Gestalt-Switch and the Duty to Invent as Preconditions for Economic Growth

This paper discusses changes in the level of knowledge, i.e. learning, as a key source of economic growth, and argues that historically a radical change in attitude towards new knowledge has been a necessary precondition for economic growth. The Renaissance created this radically new attitude in Europe, and this paper discusses contributions to economic theory and economic policy of some of the most influential scientists involved in this process: Francis Bacon (1561-1626) in England, and Leibniz (1646-1716) and Christian Wolff (1679-1754) in Germany. It is argued that these polyhistors viewed economic change as a dynamic knowledge-based process–a view that has important similarities with modern evolutionary or Schumpeterian economics. These similarities have so far not been recognized, and the paper suggests that modern economic theory would benefit from studying the theoretical and practical economics of these philosophers who laid the foundations for the industrial revolution.     

International Organisation as Coordination in N-Person Games

One major problem in global governance is the specification of decision-making rules for international and regional organisations to coordinate the states of the world. Various organisations use different decision-making rules, and the properties of these rules may be compared systematically in terms of the power index approach. The power index solution concept of N-person games may be employed to display a basic problem in global governance, namely, the fundamental trade-off between state veto on the one hand and the capacity of the organisation or groups of states to act, meaning its decisiveness, on the other hand. Thus, when states coordinate through the setting up and running of international organisations, they then face a trade-off between their own control over the organisation and the capacity of the organisation to act. States make this trade-off in different ways depending upon the nature of the international or regional organisation as they reflect upon what is most important, to wit, own control or the capacity of the group to act.     

Politics, Economics and the Measurement of Power

To what extent is political power fundamentally different from or, alternatively, comparable to economic power? While it is true that the basic institutions of democratic political life - the electoral arena and the sovereign representative assembly - differ from such capitalist economic institutions as the market and the joint-stock company, the logic of the power game which takes place in both settings is quite similar. In both institutions power will be a function of the capacity to enter decisive coalitions with other players: individuals, political parties, stockholders or groups of stockholders. Power indices may therefore be employed in order to reveal aspects of the strategic gaming that takes place both in representative assemblies and at yearly stockholders' meetings. This article discusses and compares various quantitative measures of voting power in the two kinds of voting bodies.     

The new OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: better but not enough

This viewpoint addresses the extent to which the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises adequately serve as a system of global governance for MNEs. We argue that, while a 2011 revision has strengthened the Guidelines, their somewhat limited scope, voluntary nature, and less than satisfactory implementation render their potential utility unrealised.     

The European Union, the Doha Round, and Asia

Agriculture has been the most contentious issue in the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, and the European Union (EU) intervenes substantially in agricultural markets. This paper reviews these interventions in light of the EU’s participation in the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations with specific attention to Asia. It concludes that the offers made by the EU were designed precisely to avoid any real liberalization in its agricultural markets and have undermined the development aspirations of the round.

---