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Conflicts between favorites and underdogs are everyday phenomena. We examine their strategic behavior in an experimental contest, and find behavior partially consistent with predictions. Favorites given a first-mover advantage do overcommit effort relative to Nash. Underdogs often select the best response effort level given the favorite's move. Overall dissipation of the prize was significantly higher with the strategic commitment relative to Nash. qu]Life is not so mathematically idiotic that it allows only the big to eat the small, for it happens just as often that the bee kills the lion, or at least drives it mad. 相似文献
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“Beggar thy Neighbor:” Testing for Free Riding in State-Level Endangered Species Expenditures 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
An important public policy question that remains unresolved iswhether devolution will enhance sensible policy making byexploiting informational asymmetries or, instead, trigger a``beggar thy neighbor'' response and stimulate free ridingamongst localities. We analyze this question within theframework of U.S. environmental policymaking by scrutinizing aunique panel data set on state-level endangered speciesexpenditure patterns. Our empirical estimates are consistentwith the notion that states free ride, which may lead to anexpenditure equilibrium that is not Pareto efficient. 相似文献
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This paper generalizes the model of collective rent-seeking over a public good. Expanding the rent seeker's consumption bundle to include preferences over the public good and a private good, our results suggest collective rent-seeking is positively related to group size. Although free riding exists within a group, there is not a one-for-one tradeoff. In addition, rent seeking increases with wealth. Finally, total effort expended by both groups increases if either group increases in membership size, except in the case of an extremely lopsided contest. The key condition underlying these results is that the marginal utility of the public good is not inversely related to the private good. 相似文献
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Contests over the scope and strength of regulation and governance are commonplace – and commonly repeated. The same players vie for the same government prize year after year: for example, environmental standards, government contracts, research grants, and public good provision. The open question is whether more rents are dissipated in repeated regulatory contests than onetime competitions. This question matters for regulation and governance because societies should design policies to waste the fewest scarce resources. According to some, the answer is “no”, but others say “yes”– more resources are wasted when people compete repeatedly for the same government prize. Herein, we use two game theoretic equilibrium concepts to help untangle the answer. Our results suggest non‐myopic contestants are more likely to behave as partners than rivals – provided the context is relatively sterile. Several common complications help break up the tacit partnership, including a disparity in relative ability, a shrinking prize, and additional players. 相似文献
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Jason F. Shogren 《Public Choice》1990,67(2):181-189
Rent-seeking bootleggers have an incentive to subsidize the lobbying activities of the public-interest minded Baptists. We demonstrate that unless a certain set of conditions hold, the optimal subsidy will be positive and will provide a moral smoke screen for rent-seeking activities. Consequently, it will be extremely difficult to identify the actual level of rent-seeking from the public interest activities. Therefore, current empirical estimates may well underestimate the actual level of rent-seeking in the regulatory arena.I am indebted to Garey Durden for several enlightening discussions on rent-seeking and regulation and helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. 相似文献
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Reexamining efficient rent-seeking in laboratory markets 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Given Millner and Pratt's (1989) finding of behavior inconsistent with theory, we reexamine efficient rent-seeking in experimental markets. We show that (a) when r = 3, no Nash equilibrium exists and therefore behavior has no theoretical benchmark to judge consistency, and (b) when r = 1, with a new experimental design utilizing an explicit expected payoff matrix, rent-seeking behavior is consistent with both Nash equilibrium and dissipation hypotheses.The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support of The John A. Walker College of Business, Appalachian State University. Cliff Nowell provided generous advice. John Willingham supplied valuable research assistance. Michael Pratt and Gordon Tullock provided helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper. 相似文献
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We examine the possibility of forming a competitive-share group in rent-seeking contests. The competitive-share group has the following characteristics: (a) the group is treated as a single player competing with the nonmembers to win the rent, (b) the members choose their outlays noncooperatively, and (c) the members compete to take larger shares of the rent. We show that the competitive-share group is always formed voluntarily. One important consequence of such group formation is that rent dissipation is less relative to individual rent seeking — in other words, the social cost associated with rent seeking is less. 相似文献
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