Entry barriers and medical board funding autonomy

In this paper we develop and test the hypothesis that institutional funding arrangments affect the extent to which public agencies are influenced by special interests. We test this hypothesis using data on state medical boards. In 1989, medical boards in twenty-one states received budget appropriations from their legislatures. The remaining boards operated independent of legislative control, financing their activities from fees and other revenues. We find that budgetary autonomy does influence agency decisions. The ability of physicians to restrict entry is enhanced where licensing boards are self-financed.     

Congressional allocation of federal funds: The Job Training Partnership Act of 1982

This paper examines the allocation of federal funds to the fifty states through the Job Training Partnership Act of 1982. Targeted at the economically disadvantaged, its allocation formula nevertheless places heavy weights on unemployment measures unrelated to the target group. Evidence is presented that supports the premise that JTPA formula allocations across states reflect political influence. This is the first study to find evidence of a relationship between state representative legislative tenure and federal fund allocations. The importance of a state's political power in influencing federal fund allocations is also revealed.