THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STOCKPILE

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What congressmen knew and when they knew it: Further evidence on the origins of U.S. broadcasting regulation

This paper presents richer contemporaneous evidence of Congress's role in the passage of the Radio Act of 1927, the act which established the basic statutory framework that still governs federal regulation of broadcasting in the United States. Recent analysis finding the court's decision in Tribune Co. v. Oak Leaves Broadcasting Station to have been the cause of Congress's action on the radio bill is shown to rest on an inaccurate chronology of congressional decisionmaking. More closely examining the actions of legislators upon whose votes passage of the radio act depended, this paper contributes new evidence of strategic orchestration surrounding the perceived “chaos of the airwaves” that stimulated broadcasting regulation. Original congressional documents show that, in a political context characterized by costly information, intra-congressional manipulation of information costs was an important factor in the adoption of the Radio Act of 1927. Personal ties between executive branch officials are shown to have spawned a key legal opinion that prompted passage of the radio bill.     

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This paper suggests a practical mechanism to mitigate problems of demand revelation and free riding that arise when efforts are made to create urban amenities such as parks or nature preserves through voluntary private purchase. Building on the work of earlier writers, the model provides a potential way to increase voluntary donations for local public goods, holding constant the incentive to free ride, while simultaneously introducing a mechanism — the refundable trust — that reduces the incentive to free ride. A case involving implementation of this mechanism is described.     

REGULATION OF ASBESTOS THE MICROANA1YTICS OF GOVERNMENT FAILURE

This article analyzes the government's role in regulating asbestos-related health hazards in the United States. The U.S. government has served as both promoter and regulator of the U.S. asbestos industry, and this article examines the extent to which—in both capacities—it has hindered rather than facilitated the information dissemination essential to voluntary assumption of asbestos related risks. In documenting the behavior of the major government actors, this paper investigates the political and economic forces that have shaped U.S. asbestos policy. It shows how the Congressional transition from promoter to regulator of the asbestos industry can be explained by the susceptibility of political processes to transaction-cost augmentation by the bureaucracy.     

On the efficiency of law: A public choice perspective

The authors thank Robert Higgs, Charles Rowley, and Gordon Tullock for helpful comments on an earlier draft. They also thank participants at the Law and Economics Session of the Public Choice Society's 1989 annual meetings for constructive suggestions.